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Abstract
The canonical model of Allingham and Sandmo (1972) predicts that firms evade taxes by
optimally trading off between the costs and benefits of evasion. However, there is no direct
evidence that firms react to audits in this way. We conducted a large-scale field experiment
in collaboration with Uruguay’s tax authority to address this question. We sent letters to
20,440 small- and medium-sized firms that collectively paid more than 200 million dollars in
taxes per year. Our letters provided exogenous yet nondeceptive signals about key inputs
for their evasion decisions, such as audit probabilities and penalty rates. We measured the
effect of these signals on their subsequent perceptions about the auditing process, based on
survey data, as well as on the actual taxes paid, based on administrative data. We find that
providing information about audits had a significant effect on tax compliance but in a manner
that was inconsistent with Allingham and Sandmo (1972). Our findings are consistent with an
alternative model, risk-as-feelings, in which messages about audits generate fear and induce
probability neglect. According to this model, audits may deter tax evasion in the same way
that scarecrows frighten off birds.
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1 Introduction
Tax audits have been standard tools of most tax administrations throughout history. Audits
increase tax revenues directly, because firms caught evading must pay taxes on the hidden
income and corresponding penalties. However, with the exception of large taxpayers, these
direct revenues are insufficient to make audits cost-effective. Audits play a central role in
the deterrence paradigm of tax evasion: the threat of being audited in the future, of being
caught evading and having to pay penalties deters firms from evading taxes in the present.
Audits may be useful to foster tax compliance, but there is no direct evidence on how
firms react to audits. The Allingham and Sandmo (1972) model (hereafter, A&S) is the
canonical model of tax evasion in economics. This model is an application of Becker (1968),
in which selfish individuals choose whether to engage in criminal activities based on the
tradeoff between expected costs and benefits. In A&S, firms choose the optimal amount
of income to hide from the tax authority so that the marginal benefits (i.e., the lower tax
burden) equal the marginal costs (i.e., the penalties if caught). Whether firms in the real
world react to audits in a calculated manner, as in A&S, is still a source of debate (Alm
et al., 1992; Dhami and al Nowaihi, 2007; Luttmer and Singhal, 2014; Slemrod, 2018). In
this study, we provide direct tests of the A&S model based on a high-stakes, large-scale field
experiment.
We study a context in which firms should be most attentive to the threat of being audited:
small- and medium-sized firms that are subject to the Value Added Tax (VAT). For other
sources of taxable income, such as wage income, tax agencies can use third-party reporting
to detect evasion automatically. For example, a tax agency can use a computer algorithm to
compare the wage amount reported by an individual and the amount reported by its employer
and then automatically notify the individual taxpayers of any discrepancies. Consequently,
as individuals earning salaried income are caught evading regardless of whether they are
audited, they should not respond to audits (Kleven et al., 2011). On the contrary, there is no
comparable automatic cross-checking for VAT enforcement.1 Thus, tax authorities must rely
heavily on audits to discourage VAT evasion (Gomez-Sabaini and Jimenez, 2012; Bergman
and Nevarez, 2006).
We collaborated with Uruguay’s Internal Revenue Service (from hereon, referred to as
IRS) to conduct a natural field experiment with a sample of 20,440 small- and medium-
sized firms that are subject to the VAT. For our study, the IRS mailed four different types
1While the VAT requires a paper trail, which is a form of third-party reporting, this paper trail is subject
to significant limitations. Most important, there is no simple algorithm to detect tax evasion automatically.
Second, the paper trail breaks down when reaching the consumer (Naritomi, 2016). Third, firms can also
collude with each other to tamper with the paper trail (Pomeranz, 2015).
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of letters with information about audits to the owners of each of these firms.2 Some of the
information contained in each of these letters was randomly assigned, with the goal of testing
predictions of A&S. Using IRS administrative records, we measured the subsequent effects of
the information contained in the letters on the firms’ compliance with the VAT and other tax
responsibilities in the following year. Additionally, we collaborated with the IRS to conduct
a post-mailing survey to capture the effect of this information on these firms’ subsequent
perceptions about audits.
The first part of the experimental design, following the seminal work by Slemrod et al.
(2001), measures how informing taxpayers about tax enforcement affects their tax com-
pliance. Firms were randomized into four different letter types: baseline, audit-statistics,
audit-endogeneity, and public-goods. The baseline letter type included brief and generic tax
information that the IRS often includes in its communications with firms. The audit-statistics
letter type was identical to the baseline letter, with additional information about the prob-
ability of being audited and the penalty rate, based on tax administration statistics. The
relevant hypothesis is that adding the audit-statistics message to the baseline letter will de-
ter tax evasion and thus increase post-treatment tax payments. We also can compare the
effects of this audit-statistics message with the effects of other types of messages. The audit-
endogeneity letter provides information about a different feature of the auditing process.
The audit-endogeneity letter was identical to the baseline letter, with an additional message
about how evading taxes increases the probability of being audited. The last letter type was
designed to provide a benchmark for a message that might increase tax compliance but does
not involve the tax audits. The public-goods letter was identical to the baseline letter, with an
additional message describing the social costs from evasion: all the public goods that could
be provided if tax evasion was lower.
The first part of the results show that, consistent with Slemrod et al. (2001) and the
subsequent literature, informing firms about tax enforcement increases their tax compliance.
We find that adding the audit-statistics message to the baseline letter increases tax payments
by about 6.3%. This effect is economically large: the estimated average VAT evasion rate in
Uruguay is 26% (Gomez-Sabaini and Jimenez, 2012), meaning that the 6.3% increase equates
to a 24% reduction in VAT evasion. This effect also is highly statistically significant and
robust to a number of checks, such as alternative specifications and event-study falsification
tests. The other message related to audits, audit-endogeneity, also significantly increased
tax compliance by about 7.4%. This effect is statistically indistinguishable from the 6.3%
effect of the audit-statistics message and robust. In comparison, the public-goods message
2Throughout the paper, for simplicity, we refer to firms’ perceptions and behavior as a shorthand for
firms’ owners or managers perceptions and behavior.
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had a smaller effect (4.3%) and was statistically insignificant in the baseline specification.
Its effect was even smaller in magnitude, and statistically insignificant, in the alternative
specifications.
The main goal of this experiment was not to demonstrate that firms react to information
about audits but to understand why they react. More precisely, the second and most impor-
tant part of the experimental design tests the hypothesis that firms react to information about
audits as predicted by A&S. We provide three tests of A&S. The first test exploits survey
data on perceptions about audits. If the audit-statistics letter increased average compliance,
to be consistent with A&S, it must be true that this message increased the perceived proba-
bility of being audited or the perceived penalty rate. To test this hypothesis, we designed a
survey, to be sent months after the firms received the audit-statistics and audit-endogeneity
letters, which measures perceptions about the probability of being audited and the penalty
rate.
The second test of A&S is based on heterogeneity in the signals provided in the letters.
We included exogenous, non-deceptive variation in the information about audit probabilities
and penalty rates in the audit-statistics letter. To generate this information, we computed
the average probabilities and penalty rates using a series of random samples of 50 firms.
This sample size was small enough to introduce non-trivial sampling variation in the average
probabilities and fines shown to the subjects. That is, a given firm could receive a letter
saying that the audit probability is 8%, 10%, or 15%, depending on the sample of similar
firms chosen for that particular letter. These random variations in probabilities and penalties
shown to the firms allow us to test whether, as predicted by A&S, firms evade less when they
face higher audit probabilities and higher penalty rates.
As a complement to the audit-statistics treatment arm, we designed a separate treatment
arm that created exogenous variation in expected audit probabilities in a more direct way.
The audit-threat letter type was sent to a separate sample of firms that was pre-selected by
the IRS for auditing. We randomly divided this set of firms into two groups, one with a 25%
probability of being audited and the other with a 50% probability. The audit-threat letter
informed firms of their audit probability. Again, we can test whether, as predicted by A&S,
firms evade less when they face a higher audit probability.
The third test of A&S exploits heterogeneity by prior beliefs. According to A&S, the
compliance effect of a given signal about audit probability should depend on the firm’s prior
belief about that probability. For example, a firm receiving a signal that the audit probability
is higher than its prior belief should increase its tax compliance, while a firm receiving a signal
lower than its prior belief should decrease its tax compliance. To test this hypothesis, we
construct a proxy for prior beliefs about audit probability based on variation in the firms’
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pre-treatment exposure to audits.3
The second part of the results suggests that the effects of the audit-statistics letter are not
consistent with A&S. The results for the first test, based on the survey data, indicate that
the audit-statistics message reduced the perceived probability of being audited. According
to A&S, a reduction in the perceived probability of being audited should have reduced tax
compliance. On the contrary, we find that the audit-statistics message increased average
compliance.
The second test shows that, contrary to the A&S prediction, the effect of the audit-
statistics message does change with the signals of audit probability and penalty rates included
in the letter. The estimated elasticity of tax compliance, with respect to audit probabilities
and penalty rates, is close to zero and precisely estimated. We find qualitatively and quantita-
tively similar effects between the audit-statistics and audit-threat treatment arms. Moreover,
we compare our experimental estimates to the results from calibrations of A&S. We reject the
null hypothesis of A&S, even under conservative assumptions about how much firms learned
from the audit-statistics message.
The third test also suggests probability neglect (i.e., that our messages had the same
positive effect on tax compliance, regardless of the audit probability communicated in the
message or the firm’s prior belief about such probability). Contrary to the prediction of A&S,
the effect of the audit-statistics message did not vary with the firm’s prior belief about the
probability of being audited.
Our findings suggest that small and medium firms may comply with taxes because of
the threat of being audited but not necessarily in an optimal manner, as predicted by A&S.
This leaves open the question of which alternative model best explains the firms’ reactions to
audits. Models of salience (Chetty et al., 2009) and prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky,
1979) explain some but not all findings, such as probability neglect. Instead, our preferred
interpretation is based on the model of risk-as-feelings (Loewenstein et al., 2001).
The models used for choice under risk are typically cognitive; that is, people make de-
cisions using some type of expectation-based calculus. The risk-as-feelings model proposes
that responses to fearsome situations may differ substantially from cognitive evaluations of
the same risks. When fear is involved, the responses to risks are quick, automatic, and intu-
itive and thus neglect the underlying probabilities (Sunstein, 2003; Zeckhauser and Sunstein,
2010). This risk-as-feelings model can explain our finding of probability neglect. Indeed,
3Take for instance two firms that have been paying taxes for 10 years and, by chance, one of those firms
was audited in the past while the other was not. As a result, the firm that was audited in the past will have
a higher belief about the probability of being audited in the future. The implicit assumption is that, due
to the scant information on the auditing process, firms may be forming beliefs about the audit probabilities
based on their own exposure to audits.
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we discuss suggestive evidence that fear plays a significant role in tax compliance. We also
discuss policies used by tax agencies around the world that suggest a working knowledge of
the risk-as-feelings model.
Our study relates to various strands of literature. First, it belongs to a recent but growing
literature that uses field experiments in partnership with tax authorities to study the decisions
of individuals to pay taxes. In a seminal contribution, Slemrod et al. (2001) showed that, for a
sample of U.S. self-employed individuals, those who were randomly assigned to receive a letter
from the Minnesota Department of Revenue with an enforcement message reported higher
income in their tax returns. Similar messages about tax enforcement have been shown to have
positive effects on tax compliance in other contexts (for recent reviews, see Pomeranz and
Vila-Belda, 2018; Slemrod, 2018; Alm, 2019).4 One standard interpretation in this literature
is that taxpayers react to the information about tax enforcement tools and, in line with A&S,
reduce their evasion to re-optimize their behavior. However, there is no direct evidence in
favor or against this interpretation. Our contribution is to fill this gap in the literature.
This paper is closely related to a group of studies testing the predictions of A&S in a
laboratory setting. For example, Alm et al. (1992) conducted a laboratory experiment in
which undergraduate students play a tax evasion game. Subjects can hide income from the
experimenter, but some subjects are randomly selected to be audited and, if caught evading,
must pay a penalty. The authors show that tax compliance in the game increases significantly
with audit and penalty rates, but these effects are economically small and smaller than those
predicted by optimizing behavior in the context of A&S. The laboratory experiment setting
of Alm et al. (1992) and similar studies have several advantages, such as full control over
the rules of the game and freedom in the selection of the model parameters. However, these
laboratory experiments have two main limitations. First, the subjects are typically under-
graduate students playing the tax game for the first time and with no prior experience paying
taxes in the real world. In contrast, subjects in our field experiment are experienced firm
owners who have been registered with the tax agency, and thus paying taxes, for an average
of 15 years. Second, subjects from laboratory experiments typically pay taxes amounting to
less than USD 10. In contrast, subjects in our field experiment paid on average USD 11,800
per year, which is in the same order of magnitude as the country’s GDP per capita.5 We
contribute to this literature by showing that A&S does not fare substantially better in a
natural context with experienced subjects and high stakes.
4The following are some examples: Slemrod et al. (2001); Kleven et al. (2011); Fellner et al. (2013);
Pomeranz (2015); Castro and Scartascini (2015); Dwenger et al. (2016); Perez-Truglia and Troiano (2018).
5More specifically, in the 12 months before our experiment firms in our sample paid an average of USD
7,770 in VAT and USD 4,030 in other taxes. In comparison, the GDP per capita in Uruguay was about USD
15,000 in 2015.
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Our findings also contribute to the more general debate about the determinants of tax
compliance. One of the main puzzles in the literature is that evasion rates seem too low,
given the low detection probabilities and penalty rates, especially among smaller firms and
self-employed individuals (Luttmer and Singhal, 2014). One traditional explanation for this
puzzle is based on tax morale: firms and individuals do not evade taxes because they do not
want to (Luttmer and Singhal, 2014). Our evidence suggests an alternative explanation for
the puzzle: due to the emotional nature of the decision, taxpayers overreact to the threat of
audits. In other words, audits may scare taxpayers into compliance in the same way that
scarecrows scare birds. Indeed, this interpretation can explain why, despite the low audit
probabilities and penalty rates, taxpayers seem to be significantly concerned about audits:
61% of U.S. taxpayers consider “fear of an audit” to have significant influence on their tax
compliance (United States Internal Revenue Service, 2018).6
Finally, our paper is also part of a recent but growing literature on behavioral firms
(DellaVigna and Gentzkow, 2017). We document two sources of profit-maximizing frictions.
First, the fact that firms have biases in beliefs about audit probabilities suggests the presence
of information frictions. Second, the fact that tax compliance is inelastic with respect to audit
probability and penalty rates suggests the presence of optimization frictions.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the experimental design. Section 3
presents the data sources and discusses the implementation of the field experiment. Section
4 presents the results on the average effect of the audit-statistics message, and section 5
presents the different tests of A&S. Section 6 discusses the interpretation of the findings.
The final section concludes.
2 Experimental Design
Our experiment consisted of a mailing campaign from Uruguay’s IRS with multiple treatment
arms and sub-treatments. Rather than comparing firms that received a letter to firms that
did not, all of our analyses are based on comparisons between firms that received letters
with subtle variations in their content. We can thus minimize the potential effects of simply
receiving a letter from the tax authority, which might induce compliance on its own as a
reminder to pay taxes.
The letters consisted of a single sheet of paper with the name of the recipient in the
header, the official letterhead of the IRS, and the scanned signature of the IRS General
Director. These letters were folded, sealed in an envelope with the official letterhead of
the IRS on the outside, and sent by certified mail, which guarantees direct delivery to the
6See section 6 for more details about this survey.
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recipient, who must sign upon receipt.
2.1 Baseline Letter
The first type of letter is the baseline letter, a sample of which is provided in Appendix
A.1. The baseline letter contained some information about the goals and responsibilities of
the tax authority, which the IRS routinely includes in its communications with firms. It
explained that the individual was randomly selected to receive this information, that the
letter was for information purposes only, and that there was no need to reply or to provide
any documentation to the IRS. The letters in the other treatment arms included the same
text as in the baseline letter, but also included an additional paragraphs, printed in a larger
type size and in boldface.
2.2 Audit-Statistics Letter
In the audit-statistics letter type, we added a paragraph to the baseline letter, providing
firms with information about the audit and penalty rates. According to the Allingham
and Sandmo (1972) model, we expect risk-averse firms to be interested in this information,
because it helps them optimize their evasion decisions and potentially increase their bottom
line.7 Furthermore, this information should be particularly valuable in the context of limited
information about audits. For instance, it is easy to find information online about factors
potentially relevant for firms’ decision-making, such as inflation and exchange rates. However,
it is extremely difficult to find any information about audit probabilities and actual penalties
paid by evading firms. Tax authorities seem to prefer to conceal this information.
Appendix A.2 presents a sample of the audit-statistics letter type. The additional para-
graph included information about audit probabilities (p) and penalty rates (θ) for a random
sample of firms that were similar to the recipient, as follows:
“On the basis of historical information on similar businesses, there is a probability
of [p%]that the tax returns you filed for this year will be audited in at least one
of the coming three years. If, pursuant to that auditing, it is determined that tax
evasion has occurred, you will be required to pay not only the amount previously
unpaid, but also a fee of approximately [θ%] of that amount.”
Note that we communicated the probability that firms will be audited in at least one of the
three following years, because IRS experts stated that this was the relevant probability for
7We assume that firms in our sample are risk averse, which is plausible since we deal mainly with small
and medium firms. However, A&S has been generalized to settings with risk-neutral agents (Reinganum and
Wilde, 1985; Srinivasan, 1973).
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firms’ decision-making. Uruguay’s tax law indicates that tax audits should cover the previous
three years of tax returns and, as a result, the probability that the current year’s tax report
will be audited is roughly equal to the probability that the firm will be audited at least once
over the following three years.
In our sample, the average value of p is 11.7%, and the average value of θ is 30.6%.
Tax agencies in most countries do not publish data on the values of p and θ, which makes
it difficult to compare the Uruguayan case to other contexts. In the United States, for
which some comparable data are available, these two parameters are on the same order of
magnitude: self-employed individuals face a p of 11.42% and a base θ of 20%.8
The goal of this treatment arm was to generate exogenous variation in the firms’ percep-
tions about audit probabilities and penalty rates. Because of legal and other constraints, we
could not assign different firms to different sets of information about these factors. We instead
induced non-deceptive, exogenous variation in messages that may affect these perceptions by
exploiting the sampling variation in statistics about audits and penalties.
More specifically, we divided the firms into five groups of “similar firms,” corresponding
to the five quintiles of total VAT payments in the fiscal year before our intervention. For each
firm, we then drew a random sample of 50 other firms from the same quintile (i.e., similar
firms), from which we computed the averages of p and θ. This randomization strategy gen-
erated 940 different combinations of p and θ. These estimates of p and θ were unbiased and
consistent with the explanation given in a footnote that we included in the letter, thus infor-
mation provided to recipients was nondeceptive. The footnote explained how we estimated
the values of p and θ:
“Estimates are based on data from the 2011–2013 period for a group of firms with
similar characteristics, for instance, in terms of total revenue. The probability
of being audited was calculated as a percentage of audited firms in a random
sub-sample of firms. The rate of the fee was estimated as an average of a random
sub-sample of audits.”
The values of p ranged from 2% to 25%, with an average of about 11.7%. The values of
θ ranged from 15% to 68%, with an average of about 30.6%. Figure 1 presents the audit
probability and penalty size distribution across five groups by firm size (one in each row)
8First, there is an annual probability of being audited of 2.1%, according to the ratio of returns examined
for businesses with no income tax credit and with a reported income between USD 25,000 and 200,000 (Table
9a of IRS, 2014). Each audit covers the previous 3 to 6 years, which implies that the the probability that
the current year’s tax filing will be eventually audited ranges from 5.88% to 11.42%. Second, IRS usually
imposes a basic penalty of θ=20%, although the penalties can be higher in more severe cases.
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and the distribution of the generated within-group parameters.9 The vertical line denotes
the average probability based on all members of the group. If we based our estimates of p
and θ included in the letter on the population of firms, every member of the group would
have received the same signal (the vertical line). As we computed p and θ from samples
of 50 firms, the sampling variation implies that different members of each group received
different signals. For example, Figure 1.a.1. shows that in group 1, the average p for all
group members is 8.1%, whereas the histogram depicts the different signals actually sent to
firms within the group. These signals center around the average p, but they range from 2.5%
to 20%. Note the differences in the vertical lines across groups: for firms in the first quintile,
the average randomized p is 8.1%, and this value increases monotonically up to 13.4% for
those in the top quintile. This means that a small share of the variation across subjects in
the values of p and θ included in the letter results from non-random variation across groups,
whereas the within-group variation is fully due to random variation, which is an important
factor for the following econometric model.10
2.3 Audit-Threat Letter
To complement the evidence from the audit-statistics sub-treatment, we implemented an
alternative way of randomizing perceptions about audit probabilities using an audit-threat
letter. We devised a treatment arm that randomly assigned firms to groups with different
probabilities of being audited in the following year. A sample of the audit-threat letter is
presented in A.3. The audit-threat letter was identical to the baseline letter, with the following
additional paragraph:
“We would like to inform you that the business you represent is one of a group
of firms pre-selected for auditing in 2016. A [X%] of the firms in that group will
then be randomly selected for auditing.”
This audit-threat treatment arm was applied to a separate experimental sample, a group
of high-risk firms selected by the IRS audit department. The recipients of the audit-threat
letter thus cannot be compared to those of the baseline letter. Instead, we randomly assigned
the firms in this treatment arm to two groups, one with a probability of being audited in
the following year of 25% (X=25%) and another with a probability of being audited twice
as large (X=50%). These messages were non-deceptive: the audit department provided a
9We constructed the 5 groups according to the quintiles of VAT paid during the tax year before our
intervention.
10To measure the share of the variation that corresponds to the cluster size, we regress each parameter on
the quintiles of VAT payments. Regressing p over pre-treatment VAT quintiles dummies results in R2 = 0.118,
while regressing θ over the same dummies results in R2 = 0.007.
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commitment that they would conduct audits according to these probabilities in the following
year.
2.4 Audit-Endogeneity Letter
The audit-statistics and audit-threat treatment arms conveyed quantitative information about
audit probabilities and penalty rates. We also wanted to incorporate into our research design a
message about a different aspect of the audit process. Most tax agencies, including Uruguay’s,
account for firm characteristics when deciding which ones to audit. They assign higher
audit probabilities to firms with higher evasion risk. As a result, evading taxes typically
increases the probability of being audited. This factor was incorporated as a special case in
A&S, in which audit probabilities were determined endogenously. If unsuspecting firms learn
about the endogenous nature of their audit probabilities, they should revise their tax evasion
decisions and reduce the amount of tax evaded.11
We used this insight from economic theory to devise the audit-endogeneity message about
the nature of the audit process. We asked our counterparts at the IRS to use their evasion-
risk scores to divide a small sample of firms into two groups: those suspected of evading taxes
and those not suspected of evading taxes. We then computed the difference in audit rates
from 2011–2013 between the two groups: the rates were approximately twice as high for the
former group. We used this information to create the message in the audit-endogeneity letter
type, which was identical to the baseline letter with the addition of the following paragraph
(see sample in Appendix A.4):
“The IRS uses data on thousands of taxpayers to detect firms that may be evading
taxes; most of its audits are aimed at those firms. Evading taxes, then, doubles
your chances of being audited.”
2.5 Public-Goods Letter
We also devised a treatment arm to provide a benchmark for the effect of messages intended
to increase tax compliance without directly mentioning audits. In line with previous studies
(see Blumenthal et al., 2001; Fellner et al., 2013; Pomeranz, 2015; Dwenger et al., 2016),
we wanted to include a message that would leverage non-pecuniary motives to increase tax
compliance. We designed a non-pecuniary message that was expected to be most effective
at increasing compliance by the IRS staff and authorities: a message providing information
11Konrad et al. (2016) present suggestive evidence of this mechanism in the context of a laboratory exper-
iment: taxpayers facing a situation where suspicious attitudes toward tax officers increase the probability of
being audited increase their tax compliance by 80%.
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about the cost of evasion in terms of the provision of public goods, in the spirit of the model
of Cowell and Gordon (1988).12
The public-goods letter is identical to the baseline letter, with the addition of a specific
paragraph listing a series of services that the government could provide if tax evaders reduced
their evasion by 10% (see Appendix A.5 for a sample of the letter):
“If those who currently evade their tax obligations were to evade 10% less, the
additional revenue collected would enable all of the following: to supply 42,000
portable computers to school children; to build 4 high schools, 9 elementary
schools, and 2 technical schools; to acquire 80 patrol cars and to hire 500 police
officers; to add 87,000 hours of medical attention by doctors at public hospitals;
to hire 660 teachers; to build 1,000 public housing units (50m2 per unit). There
would be resources left over to reduce the tax burden. The tax behavior of each
of us has direct effects on the lives of us all.”
We used estimates from different governmental agencies to make the calculations reflected in
this message.13
2.6 Survey Design
We designed a survey to be conducted with a sample of owners from our main subject pool,
months after they received the letters. The IRS, with the support of the Inter-American
Center of Tax Administrations and the United Nations, had previously administered a survey
on the costs of tax compliance for small- and medium-sized businesses. We collaborated with
the tax authority in the design and implementation of a new survey, which included a specific
module tailored for our research design. The survey also included seven additional modules,
designed by the IRS, about the costs of tax compliance and other topics. Appendix A.6 shows
a sample of the email with the invitation to participate in the online survey. We partnered
with local and international universities to increase respondent confidence and to highlight
that the survey was part of a scientific study and not an audit or compliance exercise by the
IRS.
To further ensure trustworthy responses, the IRS assured potential respondents that the
survey responses would remain anonymous and that they could not be traced back to specific
12This message is also related to the laboratory experiment from Alm et al. (1992), which presents evidence
that one of the reasons why people decide to pay taxes is their valuation of the public goods provided by
means of the tax revenues.
13These agencies were: Administracion Nacional de Educacion Publica (ANEP), CEIBAL, Ministerio de
Salud Publica (MSP), Ministerio del Interior (MI), Ministerio de Vivienda, Ordenamiento Territorial y Medio
Ambiente (MVOTMA).
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individuals or firms. To measure the effect of our experiment on these survey responses, we
embedded a code in the survey link to identify the treatment arm of the experiment to which
the recipient was assigned. These codes did not uniquely identify any single firm, but they
allowed us to link treatment arms and survey responses while maintaining the anonymity of
responses.
Appendix A.7 shows a snapshot of our survey module. We designed questions to assess
whether the audit-statistics message shifted perceptions of the recipients of our letters, by
means of the two following questions:
Perceived Audit Probability: “In your opinion, what is the probability that the
tax returns filed by a company like yours will be audited at least in one of the
next three years (from 0% to 100%)?”
Perceived Penalty Rate: “Let us imagine that a company like yours is audited
and that tax evasion is detected. What, in your opinion, is the penalty (in %)
as determined by law that the firm must pay in addition to the originally unpaid
amount? For example, a fee of X% means that, for each $100 not paid, the firm
would have to pay those original $100 plus $X in penalties.”
After each question, we elicited how certain the subject felt about his or her response on a
scale from 1 to 4, where 1 is “not at all sure” and 4 is “very sure.” For the sake of completeness,
we also included a question in the survey to measure the subject’s awareness about the
endogeneity of audit probabilities. This question and its results are described in detail in
Appendix B.3.2.
3 Data Sources and Implementation of the Field Ex-
periment
3.1 Institutional Context
Uruguay is a South American country with an annual GDP per capita of about USD 15,000
in 2015. Total tax revenues (i.e., for all levels of government) were about 19% of GDP in
2015 and, as is common in many countries, VAT represents the largest source of tax revenue,
accounting for roughly 50% of the total tax collection.14 Firms are required to remit VAT
14Own calculations based on data from the Central Bank of Uruguay and from the Internal Revenue
Service. Other sources of tax revenues include the personal income tax, the corporate tax, and some specific
taxes to consumption, businesses and wealth.
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payments all along the production and distribution chain.15 The standard VAT rate is 22%.16
Our main focus is on the VAT, which represents the largest tax liability for firms in
Uruguay. An important factor in our context is that VAT has limited third-party reporting.
The amounts reported for other sources of taxable income are subject to automatic third-
party reporting, and thus taxpayers would be caught evading even without audits. For
instance, wage income is hard to conceal in modern economies, because employers are usually
required to report their employees’ earnings to the tax authority. Consequently, tax evasion
can be detected and deterred even without conducting an audit (Kleven et al., 2011). Even
if VAT requires a paper trail, this reporting has significant limitations in practice. The paper
trail breaks down when reaching the consumer, and firms can collude with each other or
with customers to tamper with the paper trail, for instance, by offering discounts for sales
without receipts (Pomeranz 2015; Naritomi 2016).17 In this institutional setting and in the
case of VAT liabilities for small and medium firms, audits represent the main tool for evasion
deterrence. They are the primary mechanism through which tax administrations can detect
and deter VAT evasion (Gomez-Sabaini and Jimenez, 2012; Bergman and Nevarez, 2006).
Uruguay does not seem an atypical country in terms of tax evasion and tax morale.
According to estimates from Gomez-Sabaini and Jimenez (2012), evasion of VAT in Uruguay
was around 26% in 2008. This is the third-lowest rate among the nine Latin American
countries included in the study and comparable to evasion rates in more developed economies.
For example, similar computations suggest an evasion rate of 22% for Italy in 2006 (Gomez-
Sabaini and Moran, 2014).18 Regarding tax morale, we used data from the 2010–2013 wave
of the World Values Survey. According to this data, 77.2% of respondents from Uruguay
stated that evading taxes is “Never Justifiable,” whereas this proportion is 68.2% on average
(population-weighted) for all other Latin American countries and 70.9% for the United States.
15Firms may credit VAT paid on input costs (i.e., imports and purchases from their suppliers) against the
total sales of goods and services to their costumers (i.e., “tax debit”). They pay VAT to the IRS only on
the excess of the total “tax debit” over the tax credit. If the tax credit exceeds the debit, the excess may be
carried over for future tax years. While the VAT should in theory be similar in its effects to a retail sales
tax, in practice the two types of taxes differ in some substantial aspects (Slemrod, 2008).
16A small number of products considered basic necessities either have a 10% rate or are exempt from the
tax.
17At the time of our experiment, firms the IRS had not yet implemented standardized electronic receipts.
In the future, these electronic systems may facilitate and automatize the cross-check of the VAT trail to
detect evasion.
18Gomez-Sabaini and Jimenez (2012) compute those rates by applying the “indirect” method to estimate
tax evasion. This method is based on the comparison of collected VAT to aggregate consumption data from
the System of National Accounts (SNA).
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3.2 Subject Pool and Randomization
Our experiment was conducted in collaboration with the IRS of Uruguay. As of May 2015,
there were 120,142 firms registered in the agency’s database. A subsample of 4,597 firms,
preselected by the IRS, was put aside for the audit-threat sample, which we call the secondary
experimental sample. Of the remaining firms, we followed a series of criteria to select our
main experimental sample. We first excluded some firms by request of the IRS. For instance,
we excluded firms subject to special regimes for VAT payments (very small or very large
firms). We also kept in the experimental sample only those firms that made VAT payments
in at least three different months in the previous 12-month period and those with a total
value of at least USD 1,000.19
To maximize the impact of our information provision experiment, we did our best to
ensure that the letters would be delivered to the firms’ owners.20 Moreover, in very large
firms, the effect of the information could be substantially diluted, as it may not reach the
owner or the individuals making decisions about tax compliance. Thus, we excluded from our
subject pool firms with a total value exceeding USD 100,000 during the previous 12 months.
These criteria left a subject pool of 20,471 firms for the main experimental sample. All
firms were randomly assigned to receive one of the four letter types, with the following
distribution: 62.5% were assigned to the main treatment arm (audit-statistics letter), and
12.5% were assigned to each of the three remaining letter types (baseline, audit-endogeneity,
and public-goods).21 After removing the roughly 18.5% of letters that were returned by
the postal service, the final distribution of letter types was as follows: 10,272 received audit-
statistics; 2,064 received baseline; 2,039 received audit-endogeneity; and 2,017 received public-
goods letters (total N = 16,392). The 4,597 firms in the secondary sample were assigned to
receive the audit-threat letter. Half were randomly assigned to the message of a 25% audit
probability, and the other half to the 50% audit probability. After excluding the 12% of
letters returned by the postal service, we were left with 2,015 firms in the 25% probability
group and 2,033 firms in the 50% probability group (total N = 4,048). Table 1 provides some
descriptive statistics for the firms in our subject pool. The firm characteristics include VAT
payments right before we sent the mailing, the age of the firm, the number of employees, and
other basic variables. Column (2) corresponds to all firms in the main experimental sample.
19The sample selection was conducted in May 2015, so this 12-month period spans from April 2014 to
March 2015.
20In some cases, owners provide the address of external accountants instead of their own or their firms.
We removed from the sample firms that were registered with an accountant’s mailing address as their own
(the IRS keeps records of addresses for all registered accountants).
21The randomization to letter types was stratified by the quintiles of the distribution of VAT payments
over the fiscal year before our intervention.
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On average, firms had 4.8 employees, had been registered with the IRS for 15.3 years, and
14% had been audited at least once over the previous three years. For comparison, column
(1) of Table 1 shows the same statistics for the universe of all registered firms. By design,
firms in our experimental sample are smaller, both in terms of number of employees and in
level of VAT payments. Finally, column (3) of Table 1 provides statistics about the secondary
experimental sample (i.e., audit-threat treatment arm). Despite some statistically significant
differences in the two groups, the firms are broadly comparable in size. The main difference
between firms in the two experimental samples is that the audit rates were 9 percentage points
higher in the audit-threat sample. This difference is by design, because the IRS selected firms
classified as high-risk for this treatment arm, and these firms had a higher propensity to be
targeted for audits in the past.
Table 2 allows us to compare the balance of pre-treatment characteristics between firms
assigned to the different letter types. Columns (1) through (4) correspond to firms in the
main experimental sample. For each characteristic, column (5) presents the p-value of the
test of the null hypothesis that the averages for these characteristics are the same across all
four letter types. As expected, the differences across letter types are economically small and
statistically insignificant. Columns (6) through (8) of Table 2 present a similar balance test,
except for the secondary sample used for the audit-threat arm. Again, the characteristics are
balanced across the two sub-treatments in the audit-threat treatment arm.
3.3 Outcomes of Interest
The letters were provided to Uruguay’s postal service on August 21, 2015. The vast majority
of the letters were delivered during September, and therefore we set August as the last month
of the pre-treatment period and October as the first month of the post-treatment period.
The main outcome of interest in our study is the total amount of VAT liabilities remitted
by taxpayers in the 12 months after receiving the letter.22 To test for the persistence of
our treatment effects, we defined a second period of observation between October 2016 and
September 2017 (i.e., up to two years after the intervention).
On average, the total amount of VAT paid by firms that received the baseline letter
in the 12-month pre-treatment period was about USD 7,700, whereas the amount for the
corresponding post-treatment period was approximately USD 6,500. This negative trend
in VAT payments can be explained by the fact that this sample contains a high share of
small firms with a high turnover rate. The size of post-treatment VAT payments varied
substantially, ranging from the 10th percentile of USD 400 to the 90th percentile of USD
22This variable includes all VAT payments, including direct VAT payments and indirect VAT withholdings.
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16,550.23
We can further break down firms’ VAT payments according to their timing. We can
observe the date of transfer to the IRS as well as the month for which the payment was
imputed. Firms can back-date payments to cover liabilities from previous periods. As firms
typically make VAT payments on a monthly basis, they normally cover the current and
previous months, which we call concurrent payments. We classified payments for two or
more months in the past as retroactive payments. About 99.4% of firms made at least one
concurrent payment in the 12-month pre-treatment period, whereas only 23.8% of firms made
at least one retroactive payment over this same period.
Finally, although we focused on VAT payments in our analysis, we obtained data from
the IRS on the other main taxes paid by the firms, such as corporate income taxes and net
worth taxes. These two taxes and the VAT jointly represent more than 96% of the total tax
burden of firms. We used payments of these taxes as additional outcomes of interest to study
whether firms effectively changed their overall compliance or if they substituted evasion of
VAT for that of other taxes.
3.4 Survey Implementation
The IRS communicates mainly by postal mail, and it thus has mailing addresses for all
registered firms. It also keeps records of email addresses for a subset of firms that have used
their online services. We emailed invitations to all firms in the main experimental sample
with a valid email address. Our intention was to survey firms soon after they received our
letters, but the survey was postponed due to implementation challenges. We sent email
invitations to participate in the online survey to 3,845 firms in May 2016, about nine months
after our mailing experiment. Table 1 shows that the firms we invited to the survey (column
(5)) were similar in characteristics to those in the main experimental sample (column (2)).
Our purpose was to elicit the beliefs of firm owners. We did not include email addresses
that were repeated more than three times in the full sample, as these most likely corresponded
to accounting firms representing multiple small and medium enterprises. Even after applying
this criteria, the IRS records could not ensure that the registered email address corresponded
to the firms’ owners. We thus asked the survey respondent to self-identify as one of the
following five types: owner, internal accountant, external accountant, manager, or other
employee. From the 3,845 recipients that we invited to participate in the survey, we received
2,331 responses (response rate of 60.6%). Of these 2,331, 45% self-identified as owner, 16.2%
23Table B.1 in Appendix B.1 presents detailed descriptive statistics about the distribution of pre- and
post- treatment payments for firms that received the baseline letter type.
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as non-owner, and the remaining 38.8% did not provide a response to this question.24 In
our main specification, we excluded responses that identified recipients as non-owners. The
results were similar if we included only those who actively identified as owners (reported in
Appendix B.3.1). Among respondents who self-identified as owners, the missing data rate for
our three key questions was between 19.5% and 23.3%, which is comparable to the average
non-response rate for all questions in the survey (17.8%). Finally, per request of the IRS,
respondents could skip as many questions as they wanted.
4 Results: Average Effect of Messages
4.1 Econometric Specification
Our main speficication captures the impact of our mailing campaign on our outcomes of inter-
est (subsequent tax payments). These results are obtained by comparing the post-treatment
tax payments of firms assigned to the audit-statistics, audit-endogeneity, and public-goods
letters with the payments from recipients of the baseline letter. We interpret these as the
effects of the corresponding messages (audit-statistics, audit-endogeneity, and public-goods)
which are the additional information we added to the baseline letter.
Consider the sample of firms assigned to either baseline letter or one of the other letter
types, indexed by j: audit-statistics, audit-endogeneity or public-goods. The main specifica-
tion is given by the following regression:
Yi = α + β ·Dji +Xiδ + i (1)
The outcome variable (Yi) is the total outcome in the 12-month post-treatment period
(i.e., after the delivery of the treatment letter). Dji is a dummy variable that takes the value
0 if i was assigned to the baseline letter, and the value 1 if i was assigned to letter type j.
Finally, Xi is a vector of control variables. When outcomes are persistent over time, which
applies to the case of VAT payments, the use of pre-treatment controls can help reduce the
variance of the error term and thus results in gains in statistical power (McKenzie, 2012).
Specifically, our main specification includes the outcomes during each of the previous 12
pre-treatment months as control variables (Xi).
This main specification allows us to test our first set of hypotheses: whether providing
letters with information about enforcement increases tax compliance. The β coefficient cor-
responding to the audit-statistics message reflects the impact of adding the audit-statistics
24The non-owner responses are distributed as follows: 4.4% as internal accountant, 5.4% as external
accountant, 1.9% as manager, 4.5% as other employee.
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message to the baseline letter. The findings in the previous literature indicate that this
should have a positive effect on tax collection. The β coefficient for the audit-endogeneity
message, in turn, provides a benchmark for the audit-statistics results by capturing the effect
of providing other type of information related to audits. Finally, the public-goods coefficient
is a further benchmark, corresponding to the effect of non-pecuniary incentives.
We rely on a Poisson regression model to estimate our main specification. There are
two reasons for the choice of this main specification. First and foremost, the Poisson model
allows effects to be proportional – indeed, the coefficients can be readily interpreted as semi-
elasticities.25 Second, the Poisson model naturally accounts for the bunching at zero of the
dependent variable. In any case, we present robustness checks with alternative regression
models, including OLS and Tobit models. We also estimate separately the effects on the ex-
tensive margin. In the interest of transparency, for each coefficient related to post-treatment
effects, we also present a falsification test based on pre-treatment “effects”; that is, we re-
estimate the model, but with pre-treatment outcomes as the dependent variable. We should
expect these pre-treatment effects to be close to zero and statistically insignificant.
4.2 Effect of the Audit-Statistics Message
We start by describing the effects of our main treatment, the audit-statistics message. We
discuss the benchmark results from the other two sub-treatments in the following subsection.
Figure 2 summarizes the results from our main specification. In each of the three panels, we
plot the difference between the VAT payments of the firms assigned to the baseline letter with
respect to the payments of firms assigned to each of the other three treatment arms, for the
two quarters preceding our mailing campaign and for the eight subsequent quarters.26 The
effects of each of the treatment arms are computed by means of Poisson regressions, so that
the coefficients can be directly interpreted as semi-elasticities. These are simple regressions
with no additional control variables.
Figure 2.a shows that the audit-statistics message had statistically and economically sig-
nificant effects on VAT payments. For instance, the point coefficient corresponding to the
third post-treatment quarter implies that the audit-statistics message increased the VAT pay-
ments by 8.7% (p = 0.012). The effects are similar in magnitude for all the post-treatment
25The Poisson model is based on the following specification: log(YX) = α + βX + ε. The effect of a
unit change in X can be re-expressed in log-units of the dependent variable, β = log(YX=x+1)− log(YX=x).
Provided this coefficient is small enough, it can be approximated accurately as a percent-change effect:
β = log(YX=x+1)− log(YX=x) ≈ YX=x+1 − YX=x
YX=x
.
26We top-coded all outcomes of interest at the 99.99% percentile to avoid the contamination of the results
by outliers.
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quarters during the first year (e.g, 7.8%, 5.8%, 8,7% and 5.7% in the first through fourth
quarter). During the second year, the effects become smaller and less statistically significant
over time. The coefficients on the pre-treatment VAT payments correspond to a falsification
test for our experiment. As expected by the random assignment of firms to different treat-
ment arms, the pre-treatment differences in VAT payments are economically small and not
statistically significant.
Table 3 presents the baseline regression results. These estimates are obtained by means
of Poisson regressions with pre-treatment controls, following the econometric specification
described in Section 4.1. The first column presents the main results: the average effects of
each of the three treatments (audit-statistics in Panel A, audit-endogeneity in Panel B, and
public-goods in Panel C) compared to the outcomes for firms that received the baseline let-
ter. The post-treatment coefficients correspond to regressions with total VAT paid in the 12
months after the delivery of the letter as the dependent variable (October 2015 - September
2016). Additionally, as falsification tests, the pre-treatment coefficients correspond to regres-
sions with total VAT paid in the 12 months prior the delivery of the letter as the dependent
variable (September 2014 - August 2015).
The post-treatment coefficient of audit-statistics (first column, panel a.) indicates that
firms receiving this message paid 6.3% more VAT in the 12 months after the intervention
on average. This effect is not only statistically significant (p = 0.013), it is also econom-
ically substantial. Using the estimated average evasion rate of 26% from Gomez-Sabaini
and Jimenez (2012), the effect amounts to a reduction in the evasion rate of 24% (= 6.3%26% ).
As expected, the “effect” on pre-treatment outcomes (our falsification test) is close to zero
(−0.8%), statistically insignificant, and even more precisely estimated than the corresponding
post-treatment effect.27
In terms of previous findings in the literature, the effects of our audit-statistics treatment
are not directly comparable to those of the audit message from Pomeranz (2015) because the
messages differed in content, and because the two studies cover firms from different countries
and with different characteristics. Nevertheless, Table 4 from Pomeranz (2015) indicates that
the deterrence letter in that study led to an increase in VAT payments of 7.6%, which is similar
in magnitude and statistically indistinguishable from the 6.3% effect of our audit-statistics
message. Moreover, our results are consistent with a broader literature that finds effects of
messages about enforcement on tax compliance in a variety of contexts: self-employed income
in the United States (Slemrod et al., 2001), wage income taxes in Denmark (Kleven et al.,
2011), individual public-TV fees in Austria (Fellner et al., 2013), individual municipal taxes
27The standard error on the pre-treatment coefficient is 0.021, which is smaller than the corresponding
standard error of 0.025 for the post-treatment coefficient.
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in Argentina (Castro and Scartascini, 2015), an individual church tax in Germany (Dwenger
et al., 2016), and U.S. tax delinquencies in the United States (Perez-Truglia and Troiano,
2018).
The second column in Table 3 replicates the analysis for the second year after the treat-
ment, i.e. October 2016 - September 2017. For this period, the effect of the treatment is
less than half than that of the first year, and it is not statistically significant, even though
the precision of the estimate is similar in the two time periods. This is consistent with the
pattern of effects by quarter depicted in Figure 2.a, which shows that the effects in the sec-
ond year fall substantially when compared to those of the first year. These results are not
unexpected. Over time, individuals may forget the information conveyed by the letter, or it
may become less salient. Individuals may also update their beliefs and perceptions for other
reasons, for instance because of new events such as audits and information campaigns. This
is consistent with previous evidence on the effects of tax enforcement messages. Figure 2 in
Pomeranz (2015) shows that the effects of the main information campaign in that study were
also substantially higher in the first 12 months after their intervention, and fell substantially
and became virtually zero in the 18th month (the last plotted result in the Figure).
Table 3 also presents results for complementary outcomes. As discussed in the previous
section, firms in Uruguay make payments for their current liabilities, but also for taxes that
correspond to previous periods — because they owe past taxes, because they revise their
accounts and correct past mistakes, or because they impute invoices that were not available
at the time of the original payment. When firms that engage in tax evasion face a heightened
threat of being audited, we can expect them to increase their tax payments (reduce their
evasion) in the future, but we can also expect them to retroactively revise their payments for
previous time periods to reduce or eliminate their past evasion. We explore this possibility
with the results presented in columns (3) and (4) of Panel a in Table 3, which split the effects
of our treatment arms on retroactive and concurrent payments. These results correspond
to the first year after the treatment. The messages about audits had an economically and
statistically significant effect on retroactive payments. Indeed, because of the much lower
baseline rate, the effects on retroactive payments are larger in magnitude than the effects on
the concurrent payments. For instance, the effect for audit-statistics message is 38.1% (p =
0.004) for the retroactive payments and 4.4% (p = 0.087) for the concurrent payments.
We have so far established that firms in the audit-statistics treatment arms increased
their VAT payments compared to recipients of the baseline letter. Our analysis focuses on
VAT liabilities, which represents the largest fraction of tax payments by firms in our sample/
However, our letters referred to taxes in general and did not mention VAT nor any other
specific tax. Given the presence of other tax liabilities, the effects we reported on VAT may
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not represent a net increase in tax payments: firms may increase their evasion (i.e., reduce
their payments) of other taxes they are liable for, crowding out payments or substituting
evasion. The results in columns (5) and (6) of Table 3 shed light on these issues. Column
(5) presents the effect on all other taxes paid (mostly the corporate income tax): the effects
on payments of other taxes are as economically and statistically as significant as those on
VAT payments: the audit-statistics had an effect of 7.7% (p = 0.038) on other tax payments.
Column (6) shows that the results are robust if we look at the effects on the sum of VAT and
other taxes: the audit-statistics message increased this outcome by a statistically significant
5.2%.
4.3 Benchmarks to the Audit-Statistics Message
Our research design allows us to compare the effects of the audit-statistics message to the
effects of two alternative messages, one related to audits (audit-endogeneity) and another not
related to audits nor other forms of enforcement (public-goods).
Figure 2.b shows that the audit-endogeneity treatment arm also induced a significant
change in VAT payments compared to the baseline letter. The quarterly effect of adding the
audit-endogeneity message is positive and statistically significant in the first post-treatment
year, and ranges between 10% and 12.4%. These effects are slightly higher than those of
the audit-statistics treatment arm, but these differences are not statistically significant at
standard levels. As in the case of the audit-statistics message, the effects of the audit-
endogeneity treatment are persistent over the first year, but diminish over the second post-
treatment year. The results of the falsification test are also similar to the ones observed in the
audit-statistics treatment: the differences for the two pre-treatment quarters are economically
small and not statistically significant for the audit-endogeneity treatment arm.
This overall pattern of results is confirmed by the regression results presented in Panel b
in Table 3. The coefficient in the first column indicates that the audit-endogeneity message
increased subsequent VAT payments by 7.4% (p = 0.021), with no “effect” on pre-treatment
outcomes, as expected. The effect during the first post-treatment year is similar in magnitude
to the 6.3% effect of our audit-statistics message (the difference is not statistically significant
at standard levels). The effects over the second post-treatment year are also consistent
with those of the audit-statistics message: the coefficients for the second year are smaller in
magnitude than those for the first year, and they are not statistically significant. The audit-
endogeneity message also had an economically and statistically significant effect on both
retroactive (31.4%) and concurrent payments (6.1%), as in the case of the audit-statistics
message. Finally, the results in columns (5) and (6) of Table 3 indicate that, again as in the
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case of the audit-statistics message, the audit-endogeneity message did not crowd out other
tax payments: it increased non-VAT tax payments by 8.4%.
We now turn to the effects of the public-goods treatment arm. Figure 2.c indicates that
adding this message to the baseline letter did not affect VAT payments as consistently as the
two other treatments. While there are differences in post-treatment VAT payments between
firms assigned to the public-goods letters and those assigned to the baseline letter, inspection
of coefficients over time reveals that the differences in the post-treatment period were similar
to the differences in the pre-treatment period.
Given these pre-treatment differences, the assessment of the effect of the public-goods mes-
sage requires us to control for them. This is presented in Panel c in Table 3. The effect for
the first year of the post-treatment period as a whole for the public-goods message is positive
at 4.3%, and falls to 0.6% in the second year, and neither of these two coefficients are sta-
tistically significant at standard levels (p-values of 0.147 and 0.879 respectively). Compared
to the other two treatment arms, these effects are smaller, but due to the lack of precision
they are statistically indistinguishable. The coefficients are not statistically significant in
any of the alternative specifications. The public-goods message did not have a statistically
significant effect either on retroactive or concurrent VAT payments (p-values of 0.304 and
0.879, respectively). The effect of the public-goods message on other tax payments (column
5 in Panel c in Table 3) is close to zero (0.1%) and statistically insignificant. The effect
of the public-goods message on total tax payments is also small (1.8%) and statistically in-
significant. Due to the precision of our estimates, we cannot rule out that the public-goods
message may have had some effect on tax payments. However, this findings is consistent with
the robust finding that moral suasion messages do not have significant effects on tax evasion
in a variety of contexts (Blumenthal et al., 2001; Fellner et al., 2013; Castro and Scartascini,
2015; Dwenger et al., 2016; Meiselman, 2018; Perez-Truglia and Troiano, 2018).28
Appendix B.2.1 presents some additional robustness checks, including regression results
based on alternative specifications such as OLS, Tobit and Probit models, as well as focusing
on the extensive margin, and using an alternative independent source of administrative data.
We show that the main findings are qualitatively and quantitatively similar to those presented
in this section, and thus robust to these alternatives.
28There are some exceptions in the literature, such as the effect of displaying norms on the timing of tax
payments (Hallsworth et al., 2017).
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5 Tests of A&S
The results presented in the previous section are broadly consistent with the evidence in the
previous literature: providing information about audits significantly increased tax compli-
ance. In this section, we present additional evidence to establish whether the effects of the
audit-statistics treatment are driven by the A&S mechanism. The subsections below present
three different tests of A&S.
5.1 First Test of A&S: Effects on Perceptions
According to A&S, the audit-statistics message should have a positive effect on tax compliance
if it increased the perceived probability of being audited, the perceived value of the evasion
fine, or both. We explore this hypothesis based on data from our post-treatment survey.
This survey data consists of 365 firms in the audit-statistics group and 137 in what we refer
to as the pooled control group with individuals who did not receive information related to
audits.29
Figure 3.a and 3.b depict the distributions of perceptions about audit probabilities and
penalty rates, respectively, as elicited from the survey. The shallow bars with solid borders
correspond to the perceptions of firms that received the audit-statistics message. The shaded
gray bars depict the distribution of perceptions for individuals from firms in the pooled control
group. The red dashed curve, in turn, corresponds to the distribution of signals sent to firms
in the audit-statistics letters. The comparison between the shaded bars and the red curve
from Figure 3.a suggests that, on average, respondents in the control group substantially
overestimated the probability of being audited. While our administrative data on audits
indicates a probability of about 11.7%, the mean perception for the control group is 40.7%
(p-value < 0.01 for the difference). This finding of overestimation of audit probabilities is
consistent with prior survey evidence (Harris and Associates 1988; Erard and Feinstein 1994;
Scholz and Pinney 1995).30
Moreover, survey participants reported being confident on their responses even though
their estimates were substantially off: only 16.2% of those in the control group reported being
29The survey sample size was substantially smaller than that of our experimental sample. To increase
the statistical power of our test, we defined this control group by pooling subjects from the baseline and
the public-goods groups, since both received messages with no specific information about audit probabilities
or fines. Appendix B.3.1 shows that the results are similar, but less precisely estimated, when we only use
recipients of the baseline letter for the control group.
30However, the prior survey evidence was based on responses from wage-earners, for whom the mispercep-
tion of audit probabilities is mostly inconsequential due to widespread third-party reporting (Kleven et al.,
2011). On the contrary, the financial stakes of misperceiving audit probabilities can be substantial in our
context.
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“Not sure at all” about their perceived probability of audit (on a four point scale, ranging
from “Not sure at all” to “Very confident”).31 Indeed, even for the subgroup of individuals
from the control group who reported to be “Very confident” about their guesses, their average
belief was, if anything, slightly more biased: 42.1%, still substantially higher than the actual
probability of 11.7%.
Conversely, the comparison between the shaded bars and the red curve from Figure 3.b
suggests that the average belief about the penalty rates was unbiased: the actual average
penalty computed from administrative data for the experimental sample is 30.7%, while the
mean perceived penalty is 30.5% in the control group.
The positive bias in the perceived audit probability can be explained by the availability
heuristic bias (Kahneman and Tversky, 1974). According to this model, individuals judge
the probability of an event by how easily they recall instances of it. Even though audits are
rare, the fact that they may be visible for colleagues and even sometimes salient in the media
may induce firms to perceive them to be more frequent than they actually are. Indeed, there
is evidence that individuals overestimate the probabilities of a wide range of rare events of a
similar nature (Lichtenstein et al., 1978; Kahneman et al., 1982).
The systematic upward bias in perceptions of audit probabilities and the results presented
in the previous section, showing that the audit-statistics message increased tax compliance,
are not consistent with A&S. Since our letters provided information about audit probabil-
ities that was lower than firms’ beliefs, the A&S framework would predict a reduction tax
compliance. Our post-treatment survey allows us to test this hypothesis more directly. From
the assignment of firms to the different treatment groups, we can measure the effect of the
audit-statistics letter on the perceived p and θ. The shallow bars with solid borders in Figures
3.a and 3.b depict the distribution of perceptions for respondents from firms in the audit-
statistics treatment arm. Inspection of Figure 3.a indicates that, compared to respondents
in the treatment group, recipients of the audit-statistics message reported on average a lower
perceived probability of being audited, from an average of 40.7% in the pooled control group
to an average of 35.2% in the audit-statistics group (p-value of the difference 0.03). Mean-
while, Figure 3.b shows that the audit-statistics message had a small effect on the perceived
penalty rate, decreasing it from an average of 30.5% for the pooled control group to an aver-
age of 29.9% for the audit-statistics group, with this difference being statistically insignificant
(p-value of 0.85).
This analysis only provides a lower bound for the effect of our letters on perceptions.
While we are confident that our certified letters reached firms’ owners, we cannot be as
confident about whether the owner was the same person who received the email invitation
31A similar share (18.1%) reported to be “Not sure at all” about their guess for the penalty rate.
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to complete the survey. Moreover, the survey responses took place over nine months after
our letters were sent, so it is feasible that recipients had forgotten the mailing’s messages
at that point, or that they had acquired additional information in the meantime. Thus, the
true effect of the audit-statistics on the average subjective audit probability was probably
even more negative than what we report above.
To sum up, the evidence suggests that the audit-statistics treatment arm may have re-
duced the average perceived audit probability. This evidence, and the positive effects of this
treatment on tax compliance, are jointly inconsistent with A&S , according to which this
message, by reducing perceived audit probabilities, should have reduced tax payments. Con-
sistent with this evidence, Appendix B.3.2 suggests that the effect of the audit-endogeneity
message is not due to an update of recipients’ beliefs about the degree of endogeneity of audit
probabilities, because recipients were already well aware of this endogeneity.
One important caveat for this test and those we present in the following subsections is
that our analysis relates to the behavior of the average firm. While the average firm does
not behave as A&S predicts, we cannot rule out that some of the firms behave in a manner
consistent with A&S. In other words, it is possible that some firms updated their perceived
probability upwards because of the information contained in the letter and increased their
tax payments as a consequence.
Another caveat with this test is that it is based on survey data, which has some limitations.
However, we can address some of those challenges. A first concern is that our subjects may
be confused about the meaning of an “audit.” However, our survey data provides direct
evidence on the contrary. Among the 145 responses from the pooled control group, 10.3%
of firms reported that they were audited in the past three years. Since this share (10.3%)
is close to the actual share of firms that were audited (11.7%), it seems that respondents
understood the definition of an audit correctly.
A second concern with survey data is that subjects may have difficulties responding about
percentages and probabilities. However, this may be a less of a concern in our subject pool,
which is comprised of business owners who should be familiar with fractions and probabilities.
At the very least, they need some rudimentary arithmetic and understanding of percentages
to compute the VAT and other tax liabilities.
A last source of concern with our survey data is that, in some circumstances, respondents
may report probabilities of exactly 50% as a way of expressing their uncertainty (Bruin
et al., 2002; Bruine de Bruin and Carman, 2012). Responses of exactly 50% are somewhat
common in our data: among individuals in the pooled control group, 33.3% of responses
about the perceived audit probability and 16.4% of responses about the penalty rate are
exactly equal to 50%. To assess the extent of this concern, we follow the standard method
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from Bruin et al. (2002) and Bruine de Bruin and Carman (2012). We measure certainty
using a 1-4 scale from “Not sure at all” (1) to “Very confident” (4). If there were large
differences in certainty between individuals who responded exactly 50% and the rest, that
would cast doubts on the validity of the survey responses. On the contrary, we find modest
differences in certainty between the two groups.32 As a complementary robustness check, we
can conduct our analysis ignoring 50% responses and treating them as missing data. Even
with this conservative approach, individuals in the control group still substantially over-
estimate the probability of being audited: these respondents report an average perception of
31.5%, compared to the actual probability of 11.7%.
In the following sections, we provide alternative tests of A&S that do not rely on survey
data.
5.2 Second Test of A&S: Heterogeneity with Respect to Signals
5.2.1 Reduced-Form Results
The second test is based on the differential effects of the values of the signals provided in the
letters. According to A&S, the effects of the audit-statistics message should be increasing in
the signals about the audit probability (p) and the penalty rate (θ). The random variation
we introduced in the p and θ conveyed in our audit-statistics letters allow us to test this
hypothesis directly. Figure 4 starts with a less parametric look at the data. This figure
uses the main specification from before,33 looking effect of the audit-statistics message on
VAT payments, but broken down by decile of the signals included in the letter. Figure 4.a
presents the effect of the audit-statistics message by decile of the signal of p included in the
letter. In the A&S framework, we should expect that very low signals of p should reduce tax
compliance (since they most likely reduce the firms’ perceived probability of audits), whereas
the effect should become larger, and turn positive at some point, as we increase the value of
the signal about p.
The coefficients plotted in Figure 4.a, however, indicate that the effect of the audit-
statistics letter is not related to the value of p included in the letter. The coefficients are
similar in magnitude for the whole range of values from p = 2% all the way up to p = 25%.
For example, the effect is 8.8% and statistically significant (p-value of 0.016) for the lowest
32In the pooled control group, the average certainty for perceived audit probability is 2.18 for individuals
who responded a value of exactly 50%, and 2.56 for individuals who responded a different value (p-value
of difference 0.09). For the responses about the perceived penalty rate, the average certainty is 2.18 for
individuals who responded 50%, and 2.48 for those who responded another value (p-value of difference 0.35).
33Additionally, we control for dummies for the quintiles of pre-treatment VAT payments, from which we
drew the sample to calculate pi and θi.
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decile (p ∈ [2%, 5%]), and it is 5.6% and marginally significant (p-value of 0.065) for firms in
the upper decile (p ∈ [19%, 25%]). Moreover, the resulting slope (in dashed red line), while
positive as predicted by A&S, is economically small (0.0014) and statistically insignificant
(p-value=0.637).
Figure 4.b provides an analysis similar to that of Figure 4.a, but instead of looking at
the heterogeneity by audit probabilities (p) it shows the heterogeniety by penalty rates (θ).
According to A&S, we should expect a positive relationship between the effect of the audits-
statistic letter and the value of θ included in the letter. Figure 4.b shows evidence to the
contrary: the coefficients are similar for the whole range of values from θ = 15% to θ = 68%,
with the slope being negative, economically small and statistically significant.
One potential confounding factor for our findings about the lack of effect of variations in
p and θ is that some subjects might have interpreted the audit-statistics message per se as a
signal that their firms were under the IRS radar, above and beyond the factual information
conveyed in the message. We were careful to mitigate this concern in the design of our
mailings. For instance, we highlighted the fact that the letter recipients were randomly
selected. Nevertheless, some individuals may have ignored or overlooked this cue. However,
even if the recipients learned something from the receipt of the audit-statistics message, there
is no reason why they should not learn about the content of the message as well. In other
words, the test presented above continues to be valid, as A&S would still predict that the
audit-statistics message should have a differential effect depending on the values of p and θ.
To address this concern more directly, we use the audit-threat treatment arm, in which the
tax agency made an explicit threat to every recipient and thus is not subject to this concern.
Figure 5 depicts the difference in the evolution of VAT payments over time between the two
sub-treatments in the audit-threat arm, corresponding to audit probabilities of 50% and 25%.
We find no systematic difference between the two groups in post-treatment VAT payments.
This complementary test further reinforces the result that, contrary to the prediction of A&S,
tax compliance does not depend on the exact probability being audited.
5.2.2 Elasticities with respect to p and θ
For a more direct test of A&S, we can quantify the effects of the audit-statistics and audit-
threat sub-treatments in a way that can be contrasted to the quantitative predictions of A&S.
For the audit-statistics treatment arm, we use the following model:
Yi = α + γp · pi + γθ · θi +
5∑
g=2
pig · I{i∈g} +Xiδ + i (2)
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where pi ∈ (0, 1) is the signal about the audit probability included in the letter sent to subject
i, and θi ∈ (0, 1) is the signal about the penalty rate included in the letter sent to the same
firm. The I{i∈g} variables correspond to a set of dummies for quintiles of pre-treatment VAT
payments, which are the groups from which we drew the sample of “similar firms” to calculate
pi and θi. Including these controls ensures that we only exploit the exogenous variation in
pi and θi induced by our experimental design – that is, the heterogeneity due to sampling
variation. Since we are using a Poisson regression model, γp and γθ can be directly interpreted
as elasticities. For instance, an estimate of γp = 1 would imply that a 1 percentage point
increase in the audit probability conveyed in the letters increased VAT payments by 1%.
From A&S , we can expect that γp > 0 and γθ > 0 – i.e., firms tax payments are increasing
in the perceived probability of audit and evasion penalty rates. Moreover, we can compare
the values of these regression estimates to the predictions from calibrations of A&S.
A similar econometric model can be used for firms assigned to the audit-threat letter:
Yi = α + γp · pi +Xiδ + i (3)
where pi ∈ {0.25, 0.50} is the audit probability included in the audit-threat letter sent to firm
i. As in the previous regression, A&S implies a positive estimate of γp.
Panel (a) in Table 4 presents the results from the econometric model of equation 2. Col-
umn (1) of Table 4 presents estimates of the elasticities of VAT payments with respect to the
values of p and θ conveyed in the audit-statistics sub-treatments. The elasticity with respect
to the audit probability in the first year after the treatment is 0.030 (SE of 0.236, p-value of
0.897). This means that increasing p by 1 percentage point would increase VAT payments by
a mere 0.03%. The elasticity with respect to the penalty rate is −0.118 (SE 0.115, p-value of
0.304), which implies that increasing θ by 1 percentage point would reduce VAT payments
by 0.118%. The estimates are close to zero, not statistically significant at standard levels and
precisely estimated. The precision implies that we can rule out even moderate elasticities:
the 90% confidence interval for the audit probability excludes elasticities above 0.418, and
the 90% confidence interval for the penalty rate excludes elasticities above 0.071.
It should be noted that the pre-treatment falsification test does not yield any statistically
significant effect, and that the results are similar (no statistically significant elasticities) for
the other specifications: for the second year (column (2)), by timing of the payment (columns
(3) and (4)), and by type of tax (columns (5) and (6)). In most cases, the estimates are not
statistically significant. There are some exceptions, such as the coefficient associated with the
audit probability for retroactive payments, but in this case the differences were statistically
significant before the treatment too, and therefore this result is probably spurious.
As complementary evidence, panel (b) of Table 4 presents the results of the audit-threat
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treatment arm in regression form, following the econometric model of equation 3. While
the audit-threat messages implies an elasticity with respect to p of 0.376, this estimate only
borderline significant at the 10% level (p-value of 0.073) and economically small. Moreover,
the pre-treatment (falsification) coefficient (-0.342) is also borderline statistically significant
at the 10% level (p-value of 0.055), indicating that the small post-treatment effect may be
spurious.
Appendix B.2.3 present a series of robustness checks (alternative specifications based
on OLS, Tobit and Probit models, and using an alternative data source for the dependent
variable), and the results are similar. An additional robustness check, presented in the same
Appendix, shows that results are robust if, instead of estimating the elasticities with respect
to p and θ separately, we estimate the elasticity with respect to p ∗ θ (i.e., the expected
penalty per dollar evaded).
Taken together, this evidence suggests that firms did not react to the values of the pa-
rameters conveyed in our letters. Since we devoted a large fraction of our subject pool to
this treatment arm, these elasticities are quite precisely estimated.
Moreover, we can assess the economic magnitude of these differences by benchmarking
these elasticities with the quantitative predictions of A&S. The exact predictions of A&S
depend on the specific model at hand and on the values of the underlying parameters. We
provide calibrations under a number of settings that have been considered in the literature,
allowing for social preferences (Luttmer and Singhal, 2014), endogenous audit probabilities
(Allingham and Sandmo, 1972; Yitzhaki, 1987), misperceptions about audit parameters (Alm
et al., 1992) and non-audit detection (Acemoglu and Jackson, 2017). We calibrate different
combinations of these models to match the average VAT evasion rate in Uruguay (26%, as
estimated by Gomez-Sabaini and Jimenez, 2012), and compute the elasticity of tax payments
with respect to p and θ under each of the alternative calibrations.
The details and results from these calibrations are presented in Appendix C. Since all
the different calibrations lead to elasticities in the same order of magnitude, the results are
similar regardless of the calibration that we use. In our preferred calibration, we find an
elasticity of tax payments with respect to the audit probability of 4.55, and an elasticity
of tax payments with respect to the penalty rate of 3.48. We can test the null hypothesis
that the elasticities with respect to p and θ in the main specification of the audit-statistics
presented in column (1) of Table 4 are equal to those in our preferred A&S calibration. We
can reject the null that the elasticity is 4.55 for the audit probability, and that it is 3.48 for
the penalty rate (both tests with p-values<0.001). These calibrated elasticities are also well
beyond the confidence intervals for the coefficients estimated for the audit-threat model.
It should be noted that our discussion is based on the implicit assumption that a letter
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conveying the message of a 1 percentage point higher signal of p or θ will increase the
perception of the parameter by the recipient by 1 percentage point. This is probably a
strong assumption: some individuals may not have read the letter in its entirety, they may
have not entirely believed in the content of our message, or may not have updated their
prior by the full value of the signal. For a benchmark, we can compare our setting with
studies of learning from economic variables, such as the inflation rate (Cavallo et al., 2017),
the cost of living (Bottan and Perez-Truglia, 2017), and housing prices (Fuster et al., 2018).
These studies find that for each percentage point increase in the feedback given to subjects,
the average individual updates beliefs about half a percentage point. If we assume this
rate of learning, then we should double the elasticities estimated in our regressions before
comparing them to the calibrations of A&S. Under this assumption, we can still reject the
null that the estimated and the calibrated elasticities of tax compliance with respect to the
audit probability are equal (p-value<0.001 for each γp and γθ ).
Since we have survey data on the audit-statistics group, we can estimate the learning
rate directly. However, this exercise faces two significant challenges. First, we elicited these
beliefs with a survey conducted nine months after the information was provided, so the effect
of the information may have decayed substantially. For example, Cavallo et al. (2017), shows
that the effect of information on beliefs decays by about half in a matter of just three months
(similar findings are reported in Bottan and Perez-Truglia, 2017 and Fuster et al., 2018).
The second limitation is the small sample size (365 observations). With those caveats in
mind, the survey data suggests that a percentage point increase in the signal about the audit
probability provided in the letter increased the perceived audit probability nine months later
by 0.397 (SE 0.288) percentage points. This point estimate must be taken with a grain of salt
because it is imprecisely estimated and thus statistically insignificant at conventional levels.
However, it is reasurring that the point estimate suggests a learning rate that is consistent
with the learning rates from other studies used as a benchmark above.
Moreover, we can reproduce the analysis under an extremely conservative assumption
about the magnitude of the learning rate. Even if we assumed that for each percentage point
difference in the letter individuals only adjusted their beliefs by one tenth of a percentage
point, we would still fail to reject the null hypothesis that the estimated elasticities are equal
to those in the A&S calibration.
Our estimates are similar to those obtained in laboratory experiments. For example, Alm
et al. (1992) find an elasticity with respect to the audit probability of 0.169 (comparable
to our estimate of 0.030), and with respect to the penalty rate of 0.037 (comparable to our
estimate of -0.118). Indeed, the elasticities reported in Alm et al. (1992) are statistically
indistinguishable from the elasticities reported in our study.
31
The findings from the audit-statistics and audit-threat arms are also consistent with some
results from other field experiments. Dwenger et al. (2016) conducted a field experiment in
the context of a local church tax in Germany for which enforcement was very lax. In one of
their treatment arms, they included information with different probabilities of audits (p = 0.1,
p = 0.2, or p = 0.5). They do not compute elasticities with respect to p that we can compare
with ours. However, consistent with our probability neglect result, the effect on increased
compliance and increased payments is very similar (and statistically indistinguishable) for
the three treatment arms. Another related experiment, Kleven et al. (2011), included a
treatment arm with two different audit probabilities. Consistent with our results, they find
economically negligible differences in tax compliance between individuals assigned to different
audit probabilities.34 However, the evidence from Kleven et al. (2011) is not inconsistent with
A&S because, unlike in our context, their subjects face automatic third party reporting.35
5.3 Third Test of A&S: Heterogeneity with Respect to Prior Be-
liefs
5.3.1 Measuring Prior Beliefs
In the A&S framework, firms with different prior beliefs about the probability of being
audited should react differently to signals and information about this probability. To test
this hypothesis, we need a measure for prior beliefs for a particular firm. We construct a
proxy of prior beliefs based on the firm’s own audit history.
The intuition behind this approach is that, since there is little publicly available infor-
mation about audit probabilities, firms may form their beliefs based on their own audit
experience. For instance, when a firm registers with the tax authority, its initial belief may
follow the beta distribution with parameters {α0, β0}. Assume that firm i has been registered
for Ti years before our mailing campaign, and during this period it has experienced Ni ≤ Ti
audits. If firm i is Bayesian, its belief about annual probability of being audited should follow
a beta distribution with parameters {α1 = α0 +Ni, β1 = β0 + Ti −Ni}. The mean of that
belief should be α0+Ni
α0+β0+Ti . In turn, this implies a belief of the probability of being audited at
34In one of their treatments, they send letters to individuals stating large audit probabilities of p = 50%
and p = 100%. Compared with a group that did not receive any letter, they find that the letters had a
positive and significant effect on declared income and tax liability. The differential effects between these
two conditions, while is statistically significant, is economically negligible: an increase in the signal about
probability of audit from 50% to 100% increases reported income by 0.025% and taxes paid by 0.05%.
35They conduct their experiments with wage earners, for whom evasion is automatically detected through
third-party reporting without the need for audits. As a result, A&S predicts that, consistent with their
evidence, wage earners should report their wage incomes truthfully regardless of the probability of being
audited (Kleven et al., 2011).
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least once in the following three years of pˆi = 1−
(
1− α0+Ni
α0+β0+Ti
)3
. In our main specification,
we generate these proxies setting {α0 = 0.13, β0 = 1}. This baseline calibration generates an
average belief that matches the actual average probability in our administrative data, and
we offer robustness tests using alternative calibrations.36
We can use the survey data to validate this proxy for the prior belief. Among the 145
responses from the pooled control group, 10.3% of firms reported that they were audited
in the past three years and the remaining 89.7% reported that they were not. We find
that respondents from firms that were audited in the recent past reported a higher average
perceived probability of being audited (63.9%) than individuals from firms that were not
recently audited (38.1%). This different is not only economically large, but also statistically
significant (p-value<0.001).37 This evidence suggests that, consistent with our proxy, firms
are using their own audit history to form beliefs about the probability of being audited in
the future.
5.3.2 Results
In the A&S framework, the effect of the audit-statistics letter on tax compliance should be
larger for firms with relatively low priors for the audit probability (pˆ) compared to those
with relatively high values of pˆ. More specifically, the audit-statistics conveyed, on average, a
signal of pˆ = 11.7%. The effect of this message on compliance should thus have been positive
for the group with pˆ < 11.7%: i.e., on average, the signal should increase their perceived audit
probability. On the contrary, the effect of the audit-statistics message should be negative for
firms with pˆ>11.7%: on average, the signal should reduce their perceive probability of being
audited.
Figure 6 presents the results. Figure 6.a presents a binned scatterplot with the treatment
effect of the audit-statistics letter for the four quartiles of pˆ. This figure includes a vertical
dashed line at 11.7%, the average message about the audit probability conveyed by our letters.
In contrast to the predictions from A&S, we fail to find a negative relationship between the
effect of the audit-statistics message and the value of the prior belief: the slope is negative
(-0.0213), but economically small and statistically insignificant (p-value of 0.146).
Figure 6.b presents a more direct test, which combines heterogeneity in prior beliefs with
36Since we only have information about audits for firms in our sample for the previous 15 years, we set
the maximum firm age at 15 to compute these priors.
37As reported in a follow-up paper (Bergolo et al., 2018), the indicator of recent audits is the single
most important predictor of perceived audit probabilities among a host of different factors. The recent audit
experience also has a positive effect on the perceived penalty rate, but this effect is less significant: respondents
from firms that were audited recently report an average perceived penalty rate of 40.0%, compared to 29.4%
for respondents from firms that were not audited recently, although this difference is statistically insignificant
(p-value of 0.201).
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heterogeneity in signals. Instead of grouping firms by their prior beliefs, we group then by
the difference between their prior and the specific signal sent to each firm in its personalized
letter. The intuition is that the difference between the prior and the signal is the “surprise”
conveyed by our information treatment. We included a vertical dashed line at 0, i.e., at the
point were firms receive signals equal to their priors. The effect of the audit-statistics letter
on compliance should be decreasing in pˆ− psignal, positive for the group with pˆ− psignal < 0
(i.e., those for whom the signal was higher than their prior) and negative for the group with
pˆ − psignal > 0 (i.e., those receiving a signal indicating that they were overestimating the
audit probability). The results in Figure 6.b are consistent with the results from Figure 6.a:
the slope of the relationship (in dashed red line) is negative (-0.0129) but economically small
and statistically insignificant (p-value of 0.515).
Appendix B.2.2 shows that these results are robust to a number of checks. For instance,
the results are similar if we calibrate pˆ to be centered at the average perceived audit proba-
bility instead of the actual audit probability. Moreover, the results are consistent with a less
parametric version of the test, in which we simply compare the effects of the audit-statistics
message between firms that were audited in the past and firms that were not.
6 Discussion
Our experiment was designed to test the null hypotheses of A&S. Given that our evidence
rejected these null hypotheses, it remains unclear which alternative model is best suited
to explain the findings. We consider some of these alternative models in this section. To
facilitate the discussion, we organize the main findings in three groups:
• Increased compliance: on average, the audit-statistics message had a positive effect on
tax compliance.
• Reduced subjective probability: on average, the audit-statistics message decreased the
perceived probability of being audited.
• Probability neglect: the effect of the audit-statistics message did not depend on the audit
probability included in the letter nor on the firm’s prior belief about this probability.
Below we discuss the plausibility of different models:
A&S with Salience. One natural model to consider is that of salience (Chetty et al.,
2009). According to this model, firms behave as if the probability of detection and the
penalty rate are zero, unless these parameters are made salient to them. This model could
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reconcile the findings of increased compliance and reduced subjective probability: even if
those who were sent the messages adjusted their perceived audit probabilities downwards,
they would have behaved as if those probabilities were zero if they had not received those
messages. However, the salience model fails to fit other features of our findings. First, by
definition, salience models imply short-lived effects. A reminder about a non-salient tax
should affect the behavior of an agent only when receiving the information, but not later
on. This prediction contradicts our evidence about the persistent increased compliance from
firms that received our audit-statistics letter. This persistence remained for months after
the messages were transmitted. Salience models also are inconsistent with our finding of
probability neglect (i.e., making salient a high probability of audit should have a stronger
impact than information about a low probability of audit).
A&S with Prospect Theory. It is possible to incorporate prospect theory (Kahneman
and Tversky, 1979) into A&S (e.g., Dhami and al Nowaihi, 2007). This extension of the
model, however, is unlikely to explain our findings. Most important, prospect theory is
unlikely to explain our finding of probability neglect. Although differences between extremely
low probabilities can be ignored under prospect theory, the range of probabilities in our
context was far from what is normally considered extremely low (e.g., in the audit-threat
arm, the probabilities were 25% versus 50%).
Risk-as-feelings. Our preferred interpretation is based on the model of risk-as-feelings
(Loewenstein et al., 2001). The models used for choice under uncertainty are typically cogni-
tive, in the sense that agents make decisions using some type of expectation-based calculus.
The risk-as-feelings model proposes that responses to fearsome situations may differ substan-
tially from cognitive evaluations of the same risks (Loewenstein and Lerner, 2003).38 When
fear is involved, the responses to risks are quick, automatic, and intuitive, and they tend
to neglect the cost-benefit calculus. A key prediction of this model is that feelings about
risk will be mostly insensitive to changes in probability, which is known in the literature as
probability neglect (Sunstein (2002); Zeckhauser and Sunstein, 2010), or the fear that makes
individuals focus on the downside of outcomes and thus ignore the underlying likelihoods.
There is evidence of probability neglect in a range of fearsome situations involving electric
shocks, arsenic, abandoned hazardous waste dumps, pesticides, and anthrax (Sunstein (2003);
Zeckhauser and Sunstein, 2010).
38A related concept, the affect heuristic, corresponds to the quick, automatic and intuitive evaluations of
risky situations based in emotions, which might be used as shortcut for more complex evaluations of risk
(Slovic et al., 2004). Borrowing Kahneman (2003) terminology for the dual system model of the human mind,
emotions might influence the intuitive system.
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This model of risk-as-feelings can reconcile all of our key findings. It explains the finding
of probability neglect, as well as the findings of increased compliance and reduced subjective
probability. Even if the perceived probability of an audit decreased among the treatment
subjects, they still may be scared into paying more taxes, because they did not rely on
cognitive evaluations of probabilities anyway. Our interpretation suggests that taxpayers
overreact to the threat of audits. In other words, audits may scare taxpayers into compliance
in the same way that scarecrows scare birds. Indeed, beyond tax compliance, fear has been
found to drive excessive caution in other contexts (Loewenstein et al., 2001).39
There is some evidence that individuals may have an emotional reaction when dealing
with tax audits and, more generally, the tax authority. A survey by the United States Internal
Revenue Service (2018) indicates that 61% of U.S. taxpayers consider “fear of an audit” to
have significant influence on their tax compliance decisions.40 This is also reflected in the
popular press. For example, a The Washington Post (2016) article claims that “a lot of
people are super scared of the Internal Revenue Service” and that its powers “can instill a
lot of fear.” The fear of the tax authority can be extreme enough to be considered a phobia
(New York Times, 2009). Laboratory experiments also have confirmed the role of fear in
tax compliance. Coricelli et al. (2010) conducted a fairly typical tax evasion game in the
laboratory and measured how emotional arousal affected tax evasion decisions. They showed
that the intensity of emotional arousal predicts whether individuals evade and by how much.
In a related laboratory setting, Dulleck et al. (2016) showed a significant correlation between
tax compliance and physiological markers of stress during the tax reporting decision.
In other areas of public policy, the risk-as-feelings heuristic can be a problem, because it
distorts facts and promotes irrational judgment, leading to suboptimal decisions from a pure
risk-assessment perspective. For example, Zeckhauser and Sunstein (2010) and others discuss
cases involving regulation of nuclear power, vaccines, and other emotion-arousing issues.
For tax collection, these emotional biases might have positive implications, at least from
the tax authority’s perspective. In fact, some anecdotal evidence suggests that tax authorities
use the risk-as-feelings model to foster tax compliance. In the United States, for example,
a disproportionately large number of tax enforcement press releases covering criminal con-
victions and civil injunctions are released during the weeks immediately preceding Tax Day,
presumably to scare taxpayers into preparing compliant returns (Morse, 2009; Blank and
39For example, fear to terrorist attacks can make people choose other, more dangerous forms of transport;
and fear of shark attacks can lead to unnecessary legislation (Sunstein, 2002, 2003; Zeckhauser and Sunstein,
2010).
40More precisely, 32% of respondents claim that “fear of audits” exert “a great deal of an influence” and
29% “somewhat of an influence” in whether they honestly report and pay their taxes. In comparison, audits
are perceived to be as strong of a deterrent as third-party reporting: 66% of respondents stated that “third
party reporting (e.g., wages, interest, dividends)” influence their tax compliance.
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Levin, 2010). Moreover, some tax experts claim that the IRS “likes [targeting] celebrities
because they get the most bang for their buck in terms of publicity” to “scare the public into
complying” (Forbes, 2008).
Furthermore, the risk-as-feelings framework indicates that vivid imagery can effectively
instill fear and biases in risk evaluations (Slovic et al., 2004; Zeckhauser and Sunstein, 2010).
Coincidentally, tax agencies seem to resort to vivid images in some of their advertising cam-
paigns. For example, in the United Kingdom, the tax agency posts banners in all sorts of
public spaces. One of those banners, reproduced in Figure 7, shows a pair of eyes peeking
threateningly through a gash in the paper. The poster reads, “If you’ve declared all your in-
come you have nothing to fear.” The tax authority in Formosa, Argentina, was perhaps even
less subtle: its ad campaign starred a monster kidnapping tax evaders and individuals in ar-
rears with their taxes.41 The tax authority claims that the use of the monster was supposed
to be humorous, but they also may have been trying to send a subliminal message (Clarin,
2016). Similarly, a TV advertisement in the United States showed the IRS as “something
like poltergeist coming out of a TV set and the world falling apart,” followed by the phrase,
“Have you filed your income tax?” (United Press International, 1988).
These campaigns and anecdotes suggest that some tax administrations may be leveraging
fear for tax collection. Even if administrations leverage existing fear rather than instill it,
relying on such tactics is not obvious from a normative perspective, since the ethics of such
campaigns could be questionable. Moreover, actively promoting fear could have unintended
negative effects, such as imposing negative psychological stress on taxpayers. 42
7 Conclusions
The canonical model of Allingham and Sandmo (1972) predicts that firms evade taxes by
optimally trading off between the costs and benefits of evasion, but it is unclear whether
real-world firms react to audits in this way. We designed a large-scale field experiment
in collaboration with Uruguay’s tax authority to assess the factors behind firms’ evasion
behavior and their reactions to audits. Our findings indicate that firms do increase their tax
compliance when informed about the auditing process. However, we do not find this reaction
to be consistent with the predictions of A&S. For example, the information about audits
decreased (rather than increased) the perceived probability of being audited; also, the effects
of our messages about audit probabilities were independent of the signal we conveyed and
41They used an aboriginal mythical monster, the “Pombero,” a sort of boogeyman that according to
folklore took away misbehaving children.
42For a discussion on the ethical and practical issues with the use of communication efforts to increase tax
compliance, see for example Morse (2009).
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of the firms’ prior beliefs. Models of salience are consistent with the increased compliance
we observed and with the reduced perceived perception of audit probabilities, but they are
not consistent with our findings of probability neglect. We argue that all three findings can
be reconciled by the risk-as-feelings model, which highlights the role of emotions in decision-
making and which predicts that agents might exhibit probability neglect in dreaded or feared
situations, like paying taxes.
We conclude by discussing some policy implications. In the traditional framework of A&S,
the relevant policy lever is the number of audits: the tax agency must find the point at which
the marginal cost of an additional audit equals the expected marginal benefit (i.e., higher
tax revenues). Our findings suggest that small and medium firms face significant information
and optimization frictions when reacting to audits. These frictions introduce new levers for
policy-making. For example, tax agencies can decide whether to be transparent about the
auditing process,43 whether to contact taxpayers to remind them of the auditing process,
and whether to make the costs of being a tax cheat salient and vivid through advertisement
campaigns.44 Indeed, we discussed anecdotal evidence that some tax agencies may already
have a working knowledge of these new policy levers. For example, some tax agencies seem
to avoid transparency about the auditing process while increasing visibility of enforcement
actions around tax day. Some even refer to fear in their advertisement campaigns. However,
there is no direct evidence on whether these policies effectively increase tax compliance or
whether they have unintended effects, such as instigating enough fear in taxpayers to make
them so anxious and unhappy that it trumps the positive effects of tax revenues. As stated
by Alm (2019), in a recent review of the literature, “the role of emotions in tax compliance
decisions remains largely unexamined.” Our results highlight the need for more research on
probability neglect in the decision to pay taxes. Moreover, additional research should examine
the role of emotions on other important economic choices beyond tax compliance.
43On the one hand, our evidence indicates that increasing transparency about the audit probability would
reduce the average perceived probability of being audited, which could in turn reduce tax compliance. On
the other hand, our finding of probability neglect suggests that, in the end, the reduction in perceived audit
probability may not affect tax compliance.
44For a practical discussion on how to implement this type of policy, including the drawbacks, see Morse
(2009). Furthermore, this same principle can be used to improve compliance with other laws. For instance,
Dur and Vollaard (2019) show experimental evidence that salience of tax enforcement can be used to reduce
illegal garbage disposal.
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Table 1: Comparison of Firm Characteristics for Different Groups: All Firms, Firms in Main Sample, Firms in the Secondary
Sample and Firms Invited to the Online Survey
Experimental Sample
All firms
(1)
Main
(2)
Secondary
(3)
Invited to
the survey
(4)
Share paid VAT taxes (3 months pre-mailing) 0.78 0.93 0.89 0.93
(0.42) (0.26) (0.31) (0.26)
Amount of VAT paid (3 months pre-mailing) 3.72 1.89 1.74 1.89
(11.55) (2.83) (4.25) (2.98)
Years registered in tax agency 14.21 15.26 19.44 14.46
(14.85) (17.16) (12.84) (10.08)
Share audited between 2013-2015 0.06 0.10 0.14 0.08
(0.32) (0.40) (0.46) (0.35)
Number of employees 12.65 4.84 4.89 6.43
(302.97) (26.60) (5.76) (53.77)
Share retail trade sector 0.13 0.22 0.33 0.15
(0.34) (0.41) (0.47) (0.36)
Share Agricultural, forest and others 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02
(0.17) (0.17) (0.18) (0.15)
Share construction sector 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03
(0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.18)
Share other sector 0.84 0.73 0.61 0.80
(0.37) (0.45) (0.49) (0.40)
N 120,142 16,392 4,048 3,845
Notes: Average characteristics in different subsamples of the universe of firms registered in the tax agency (standard deviations in parentheses). Column
(1) includes all firms that submitted at least one payment in 2014 or 2015. Column (2) includes the subset of firms selected for the experimental
sample according to the criteria described in section 3.2. Column (3) represents a group of high risk firms that were selected from a special sample
defined by the IRS and received the audit-threat letter. Column (4) corresponds to firms with valid e-mail addresses on file with the IRS, and therefore
selected to participate in the on-line survey conducted after the experiment. All data is based on administrative tax records (monthly payments,
annual tax returns and auditing registers). Robust standard errors in parentheses.
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Table 2: Balance of Firm Characteristics across Treatment Groups
Main Sample Secondary Sample
Audit
Statistics
(1)
Public
Goods
(2)
Audit
Endogeneity
(3)
Baseline
(4)
p-value test
(5)
Audit
Threat (25%)
(6)
Audit
Threat (50%)
(7)
p-value test
(8)
Share paid VAT taxes (3 months pre-mailing) 0.92 0.94 0.93 0.93 0.18 0.90 0.89 0.54
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Amount of VAT paid (3 months pre-mailing) 1.87 1.96 1.93 1.91 0.56 1.74 1.75 0.95
(0.03) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.10) (0.09)
Years registered in tax agency 15.34 14.75 15.70 15.01 0.27 19.45 19.42 0.94
(0.17) (0.22) (0.54) (0.22) (0.28) (0.29)
Share audited between 2013-2015 0.11 0.10 0.09 0.10 0.30 0.13 0.15 0.38
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Number of employees 4.81 4.66 4.88 5.09 0.96 4.83 4.88 0.80
(0.26) (0.54) (0.57) (0.64) (0.13) (0.12)
Share retail trade sector 0.22 0.22 0.21 0.23 0.78 0.33 0.32 0.40
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Share Agricultural, forest and others 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.77 0.03 0.04 0.12
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Share construction sector 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.85 0.03 0.03 0.33
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Share other sector 0.73 0.73 0.73 0.72 0.95 0.61 0.62 0.54
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Observations 10,272 2,017 2,039 2,064 2,015 2,033
Notes: Averages for different pre-treatment firm-level characteristics, by treatment group and type of sample (robust standard errors in parentheses).
The main sample includes all firms selected as described in section 3.2. The secondary sample includes high risk firms selected by the IRS. Standard
errors in parentheses. The last column of each sample reports the p-value of a test in which the null hypothesis is that the mean is equal for all the
treatment groups. Data on VAT amount and firm characteristics comes from administrative tax records (including monthly payments, annual tax
returns and auditing registers). Robust standard errors in parentheses.
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Table 3: Average Effects of Audit-Statistics, Audit-Endogeneity and Public-Goods Messages on VAT and
Other Tax Payments by Time Horizon and Payment Timing
By Time Horizon By Payment Timing By Tax Type
First Year
(1)
Second Year
(2)
Retroactive
(3)
Concurrent
(4)
Non - VAT
(5)
VAT + Non-VAT
(6)
a. Audit - Statitstics (N= 10,272) vs Baseline (N= 2,064)
Post-Treatment 0.063** 0.032 0.381*** 0.044* 0.077** 0.052**
(0.025) (0.031) (0.131) (0.026) (0.037) (0.026)
Pre-Treatment -0.008 -0.003 -0.132 -0.005 0.016 0.037
(0.021) (0.025) (0.105) (0.022) (0.045) (0.026)
b. Audit - Endogeneity (N= 2,039) vs Baseline (N= 2,064)
Post-Treatment 0.074** 0.038 0.314** 0.061* 0.084** 0.079***
(0.032) (0.039) (0.139) (0.033) (0.041) (0.031)
Pre-Treatment -0.006 0.072** 0.008 -0.003 0.006 0.027
(0.027) (0.030) (0.125) (0.027) (0.056) (0.031)
c. Public - Goods (N= 2,017) vs Baseline (N= 2,064)
Post-Treatment 0.043 0.006 0.195 0.032 0.001 0.018
(0.030) (0.036) (0.134) (0.031) (0.048) (0.029)
Pre-Treatment -0.004 0.031 -0.192 0.002 -0.047 -0.004
(0.026) (0.028) (0.124) (0.026) (0.046) (0.027)
Notes: * significant at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, *** at the 1% level. Robust standard errors in parentheses. The
results are based on Poisson regressions, so coefficients can be interpreted directly as semi-elasticities. Panel a. compares
the audit-statistics message with the baseline letter, while results in panels b. and c. replicate the comparison for audit-
endogeneity and public-goods messages. In the first row of each panel, the dependent variable is the amount of VAT
payments (in dollars) after receiving the letter. The second row presents a falsification test in which we estimate the same
regression but using the amount contributed before receiving the mailing (pre-treatment) as the dependent variable. All
regressions are estimated with a set of monthly controls that correspond to the year before the outcome: for the the post-
treatment outcome regression, we include monthly VAT payment controls from September, 2014 to August, 2015, and for
the pre-treatment outcome we include the same variables for the September 2013 – August 2014 period. We also restrict the
analysis to firms that effectively received the letter as reported by the postal service. Columns (1) and (2) report the effect
of treatment by time horizon. Column (1) presents the estimates of the effect for the first year (October 2015 – September
2016) while Column (2) reports the effect of the letter in the second year after the treatment (October 2016 – September
2017). Columns (3) and (4) present the first year effect of treatment on retroactive (3) and concurrent (4) VAT payments.
Columns (5) and (6) report the first year results by type of tax. Column (5) presents the effect of the treatment on other
(non-VAT) tax payments, while column (6) reports the effect on the total amount of taxes paid by the firms during the
same period.
.
46
Table 4: Elasticities of Tax Payments with Respect to Audit Probability and Penalty Rate, Audit-
Statistics and Audit-Threat Sub-Treatments
By Time Horizon By Payment Timing By Tax Type
First Year
(1)
Second Year
(2)
Retroactive
(3)
Concurrent
(4)
Non - VAT
(5)
VAT + Non-VAT
(6)
a. Audit - Statitstics (N= 10,272)
Audit Probability (%)
Post-Treatment 0.030 0.170 -2.136** 0.162 0.127 0.094
(0.236) (0.236) (1.040) (0.246) (0.440) (0.266)
Pre-Treatment 0.025 -0.041 -1.984** 0.123 0.192 0.111
(0.115) (0.069) (0.806) (0.121) (0.388) (0.169)
Penalty Size (%)
Post-Treatment -0.118 -0.233* 1.044 -0.191* -0.291 -0.179
(0.115) (0.122) (0.742) (0.112) (0.180) (0.112)
Pre-Treatment -0.001 0.049 0.032 -0.001 -0.376** -0.136
(0.088) (0.034) (0.470) (0.093) (0.168) (0.086)
b. Audit - Threat Letters (N= 4,048)
Audit Probability (%)
Post-Treatment 0.376* 0.378* 0.831 0.335 0.164 0.295*
(0.210) (0.220) (0.944) (0.216) (0.185) (0.170)
Pre-Treatment -0.342* -0.214 0.013 -0.289 -0.219 -0.308**
(0.178) (0.162) (0.647) (0.182) (0.163) (0.142)
Notes: * significant at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, *** at the 1% level. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Panel a. presents the
effect of providing different information regarding p and θ in the audit-statistics message. Panel b. compares the two audit-threat messages, i.e.
the 50% threat of audit vs. the 25% threat of audit. Rows (1) and (3) of panel a. present the effect of an additional percentage point of p and
θ (respectively) in the information included in the letters on post-treatment VAT payments. The results are based on Poisson regressions, so
coefficients can be interpreted directly as semi-elasticities. Regressions are estimated using monthly pre-treatment controls and the stratification
variable used to randomize the parameters. Rows (2) and (4) present a falsification test in which we estimate the same regression using pre-
treatment information as the dependent variable. All regressions are estimated with a set of monthly controls that correspond to the year before
the outcome: for the the post-treatment outcome regression, we include monthly VAT payment controls from September, 2014 to August, 2015,
and for the pre-treatment outcome we include the same variables for the September 2013 – August 2014 period. We also restrict the analysis to
firms that effectively received the letter as reported by the postal service. Row (1) in panel b. presents the post-treatment effect of receiving the
audit-threat letter with a probability of 50% relative to receiving the letter with the 25% probability treatment. Row (2) of panel b. replicates
the estimates for the pre-treatment outcomes. Columns (1) and (2) report the effect of treatment by time horizon. Column (1) presents the
estimates of the effect for the first year (October 2015 – September 2016) while Column (2) reports the effect of the letter in the second year after
the treatment (October 2016 – September 2017). Columns (3) and (4) present the first year effect of treatment on retroactive (3) and concurrent
(4) VAT payments. Columns (5) and (6) report the first year results by type of tax. Column (5) presents the effect of the treatment on other
(non-VAT) tax payments, while column (6) reports the effect on the total amount of taxes paid by the firms during the same period.
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Figure 1: Distribution of Statistics Shown in Audit-Statistics Letters by VAT Payment Quintiles
a.1. p: Group 1 b.1. θ: Group 1
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and penalty rate (θ, in panel b). Group 1 through 5 correspond to each of the pre-treatment VAT payment quintiles.
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Figure 2: Average Effects of Audit-Statistics, Audit-Endogeneity and Public-Goods Messages, By Quarter
a. Audit-Statistics vs. Baseline b. Audit-Endogeneity vs. Baseline
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c. Public-Goods vs. Baseline
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Notes: These figures plot the quarterly effects of each treatment arm when compared to the baseline letter. Panel a.
(N=12,336) presents the effect of the audit-statistics message on total quarterly VAT payments, while panel b. (N=4,103)
represents the effect of the audit-endogeneity message and panel c. (N=4,081) depicts the effect of the public-goods message
on the same outcome variable. Each point (red circle) in the plot represents the estimate of the effect of treatment on
VAT payments for a specific quarter from two quarters before treatment up to eight quarters after receiving the letter.
Regressions do not include monthly pre-treatment controls. The results are based on Poisson regressions, so coefficients
can be interpreted directly as semi-elasticities. 90% confidence intervals represented by red lines computed with robust
standard errors.
.
49
Figure 3: Survey Results: Perception of Audit Probabilities and of Tax Evasion Penalty Rates by Treat-
ment Group
Audit Probability (p) Penalty Rate (θ)
a. Audit-Statistics vs. Baseline and Public-Goods b. Audit-Statistics vs. Baseline and Public-Goods
Letters
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
Pe
rce
nt
0 −
 9.9
9%
10 
− 1
9.9
9%
20 
− 2
9.9
9%
30 
− 3
9.9
9%
40 
− 4
9.9
9%
50 
− 5
9.9
9%
60 
− 6
9.9
9%
70 
− 7
9.9
9%
80 
− 8
9.9
9%
90 
− 1
00%
Audit Probability (%)
Perceived (pooled control group)
Mean = 40.7%
Perceived (audit−statistics)
Mean = 35.2%
Diff − p−value: 0.03
Letters
0
10
20
30
40
Pe
rce
nt
0 −
 9.9
9%
10 
− 1
9.9
9%
20 
− 2
9.9
9%
30 
− 3
9.9
9%
40 
− 4
9.9
9%
50 
− 5
9.9
9%
60 
− 6
9.9
9%
70 
− 7
9.9
9%
80 
− 8
9.9
9%
90%
 +
Penalty Size (%)
Perceived (pooled control group)
Mean = 30.5%
Perceived (audit−statistics)
Mean = 29.9%
Diff − p−value: 0.85
Notes: The histograms are based on survey responses from those who reported themselves as owners in the post-treatment
survey. Perceived (pooled control group, N=137) refers to to survey respondents who received the baseline (N=69) or
the public-goods (N=68) letters during the experimental stage (none of the two letters contained any information about
audit probabilities nor penalty rates). Perceived (aud.–statistics) refers to respondents who received audit-statistics letters
(N=365). In panel a. the x-axis represents the probability of being audited; in panel b. it represents the average penalty
rate. We report the mean responses and the p-value of the difference between the two groups. The answers correspond to
questions Q2 and Q4 (see full survey questionnaire in Appendix A.7). The red line represents the density function of the
information displayed in the audit-statistics letters, measured in the right y-axis (hidden for the sake clarity).
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Figure 4: Effect of Audit-Statistics vs. Baseline by Deciles of p and θ
a. Audit Probability p b. Penalty Rate θ
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Notes: Panel a. plots the first-year effect (October 2015 – September 2016) of the audit-statistics letter on total VAT
payments by decile of p while panel b. reports the results from the same regressions by decile of θ (N=10,272). In both
panels, each dot represents the estimated treatment effect for each decile of the parameter considered. Regressions are
estimated using monthly pre-treatment controls and the stratification variable used to randomize the parameters. All
effects are depicted with a 95% confidence interval. The results are based on Poisson regressions, so coefficients can be
interpreted directly as semi-elasticities. Confidence intervals computed with robust standard errors.
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Figure 5: Effects of Audit-Threat Sub-Treatments: p = 0.50 vs. p = 0.25
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Notes: This figure depicts the quarterly effect of the audit-threat message (N=4,048 and 50% vs 25%). Each dot (red
circle) represents the estimate of the effect of treatment on VAT payments for a specific quarter from two quarters before
treatment up to eight quarters after receiving the letter. Regressions do not include monthly pre-treatment controls. The
results are based on Poisson regressions, so coefficients can be interpreted directly as semi-elasticities. 90% confidence
intervals represented by red lines computed with robust standard errors.
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Figure 6: Effect of Audit-Statistics vs. Baseline by Prior Beliefs
a. Audit probability - prior (calibrated to 11.7%) b. Audit probability - prior - signal (calibrated to 11.7%)
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Notes: Panel a. plots the first-year effect (October 2015 – September 2016) of the audit-statistics letter on total VAT
payments by quartiles of prior beliefs while panel b. reports the same results by quartiles of the difference between the prior
belief and the signal sent in the audit-statistics message (N=11,989). The prior belief (before the experiment) is computed
as pˆi = 1−
(
1− α0+Niα0+β0+Ti
)3
such that the mean prior belief about the probability of being audited at least once in the following three years matches
the actual average probability observed in our sample. In panel b. the signal for the placebo group was randomly assigned
using the same strategy that for the audit-statistics group. The red dashed line represents the linear fit corresponding to
the four estimates . In panel a., the dashed green line represents the average perceived probability (11.7%). In panel b.,
the dashed green line represents the point in which prior belief and signal are equal. In both panels, each dot represents
the estimated treatment effect for each quartile of the variable considered. Regressions are estimated using monthly pre-
treatment controls. All effects are depicted with 95% confidence interval. The results are based on Poisson regressions, so
coefficients can be interpreted directly as semi-elasticities. Confidence intervals are computed with robust standard errors.
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Figure 7: Mass Advertising Campaign Sample: Billboard Poster, United Kingdom’s Tax Authority, 2012
Notes: Advertising campaign by the United Kingdom’s tax authority, HMRC (Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs), 2012.
Previously hosted at http://www.gov.uk/sortmytax (no longer available, accessed through http://web.archive.org/)
.
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Online Appendix: For Online Publication Only
A Replication Material: Letters and Survey
This appendix presents samples of the five types of letter in our experiment: the baseline letter (A.1),
the audit-statistics letter (A.2), the audit-threat letter (A.3), the audit-endogeneity letter (A.4) and the
public goods letter (A.5). Additionally, Appendix A.6 presents a sample of the invitation sent by email
by the IRS to complete the online survey, and Appendix A.7 presents the questionnaire module about
perceptions of audit probabilities and penalty rates that we designed and that was included in the survey.
i
A.1 Sample Letter: Baseline Letter
 
Montevideo, August 20th 2015 
 
Mr../Ms. Taxpayer: 
 
The DGI has the authority to perform inspections (see Art. 68 of the tax code) and routine 
audits of taxpayers on the basis of crosschecks and assessment of data compiled to detect 
oversights and inconsistency on tax returns as well as pending tax debts. 
 
The aim of the DGI, and the primary challenge it faces, is to ensure the collection of revenue to 
sustain life in society. Additionally, its task is to generate a framework of fair and transparent 
competition where the failure of some to meet their obligations does not have an unfavorable 
impact on honest taxpayers. In order to meet these goals, inspections are performed in a 
routine fashion. 
 
Your micro, small, or medium-sized business has been randomly selected to receive this 
information. It is solely for your information and its receipt does not require you to present any 
documentation to the DGI offices.  
 
We ask you to comply with your tax obligations for the sake of the country we all want, a more 
and more developed Uruguay with greater and greater social cohesion.  
 
Sincerely, 
 
 
 
 
 
 Collection and Controls Division 
        Internal Revenues Services 
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A.2 Sample Letter: Audit-Statistics Letter
 
Montevideo, August 20th 2015 
 
Mr../Ms. Taxpayer: 
 
The DGI has the authority to perform inspections (see Art. 68 of the tax code) and routine audits 
of taxpayers on the basis of crosschecks and assessment of data compiled to detect oversights 
and inconsistency on tax returns as well as pending tax debts. 
 
On the basis of historical information on similar businesses, there is a probability of p%  
that the tax returns you filed for this year will be audited in at least one of the coming 
three years. If, pursuant to that auditing, it is determined that tax evasion has occurred, 
you will be required to pay not only the amount previously unpaid, but also a fee of 
approximately 𝜽% of that amount. 
 
The aim of the DGI, and the primary challenge it faces, is to ensure the collection of revenue to 
sustain life in society. Additionally, its task is to generate a framework of fair and transparent 
competition where the failure of some to meet their obligations does not have an unfavorable 
impact on honest taxpayers. In order to meet these goals, inspections are performed in a routine 
fashion. 
 
Your micro, small, or medium-sized business has been randomly selected to receive this 
information. It is solely for your information and its receipt does not require you to present any 
documentation to the DGI offices.  
 
We ask you to comply with your tax obligations for the sake of the country we all want, a more 
and more developed Uruguay with greater and greater social cohesion.  
 
Sincerely, 
 
Collection and Controls Division 
        Internal Revenues Services 
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A.3 Sample Letter: Audit-Threat Letter
 
Montevideo, August 20th 2015 
 
Mr../Ms. Taxpayer: 
 
The DGI has the authority to perform inspections (see Art. 68 of the tax code) and routine 
audits of taxpayers on the basis of crosschecks and assessment of data compiled to detect 
oversights and inconsistency on tax returns as well as pending tax debts. 
 
We would like to inform you that the business you represent is one of a group of 
firms pre-selected for auditing in 2016. A p% of the firms in that group will then 
be randomly selected for auditing. 
 
The aim of the DGI, and the primary challenge it faces, is to ensure the collection of revenue to 
sustain life in society. Additionally, its task is to generate a framework of fair and transparent 
competition where the failure of some to meet their obligations does not have an unfavorable 
impact on honest taxpayers. In order to meet these goals, inspections are performed in a 
routine fashion. 
 
Your micro, small, or medium-sized business has been randomly selected to receive this 
information. It is solely for your information and its receipt does not require you to present any 
documentation to the DGI offices.  
 
We ask you to comply with your tax obligations for the sake of the country we all want, a more 
and more developed Uruguay with greater and greater social cohesion.  
 
Sincerely, 
 
 
 
 
 Collection and Controls Division 
        Internal Revenues Services 
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A.4 Sample Letter: Audit-Endogeneity Letter
 
Montevideo, August 20th 2015 
 
Mr../Ms. Taxpayer: 
 
The DGI has the authority to perform inspections (see Art. 68 of the tax code) and routine 
audits of taxpayers on the basis of crosschecks and assessment of data compiled to detect 
oversights and inconsistency on tax returns as well as pending tax debts. 
 
The DGI uses data on thousands of taxpayers to detect firms that may be 
evading taxes; most of its audits are aimed at those firms. Evading taxes, then, 
doubles your chances of being audited. 
 
The aim of the DGI, and the primary challenge it faces, is to ensure the collection of revenue to 
sustain life in society. Additionally, its task is to generate a framework of fair and transparent 
competition where the failure of some to meet their obligations does not have an unfavorable 
impact on honest taxpayers. In order to meet these goals, inspections are performed in a 
routine fashion. 
 
Your micro, small, or medium-sized business has been randomly selected to receive this 
information. It is solely for your information and its receipt does not require you to present any 
documentation to the DGI offices.  
 
We ask you to comply with your tax obligations for the sake of the country we all want, a more 
and more developed Uruguay with greater and greater social cohesion.  
 
Sincerely, 
 
 
  
Collection and Controls Division 
        Internal Revenues Services 
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A.5 Sample Letter: Public-Goods Letter
 
Montevideo, August 20th 2015 
 
Mr../Ms. Taxpayer: 
 
The DGI has the authority to perform inspections (see Art. 68 of the tax code) and routine 
audits of taxpayers on the basis of crosschecks and assessment of data compiled to detect 
oversights and inconsistency on tax returns as well as pending tax debts. 
 
If those who currently evade their tax obligations were evade 10% less, the 
additional revenue collected would enable all of the following: to supply 42,000 
portable computers to school children; to build 4 high schools, 9 elementary 
schools, and 2 technical schools; to acquire 80 patrol cars and to hire 500 police 
officers; to add 87,000 hours of medical attention by doctors at public hospitals; 
to hire 660 teachers; to build 1,000 public housing units (50m2 per unit). There 
would be resources left over to reduce the fiscal burden. The tax behavior of 
each of us has direct effects on the lives of us all. 
 
The aim of the DGI, and the primary challenge it faces, is to ensure the collection of revenue to 
sustain life in society. Additionally, its task is to generate a framework of fair and transparent 
competition where the failure of some to meet their obligations does not have an unfavorable 
impact on honest taxpayers. In order to meet these goals, inspections are performed in a 
routine fashion. 
 
Your micro, small, or medium-sized business has been randomly selected to receive this 
information. It is solely for your information and its receipt does not require you to present any 
documentation to the DGI offices.  
 
We ask you to comply with your tax obligations for the sake of the country we all want, a more 
and more developed Uruguay with greater and greater social cohesion.  
 
Sincerely, 
 
  
Collection and Controls Division 
        Internal Revenues Services 
vi
A.6 Sample Letter: Invitation to the Online Survey
 
 
Dear Taxpayer: 
 
The DGI’s strategic objectives for this period include improving taxpayer services. In 
2013, the first Survey on the Costs of Tax Compliance for Small and Medium-Sized 
Businesses was administered with the support of the Inter-American 
Center of Tax Administrations (CIAT) and the United Nations (UN). The DGI, in 
conjunction with a group of academics, has designed a new version of the survey (for 
more information, visit www.dgi.gub.uy). You can give us your answers on the website 
where you will find instructions on how to fill out the simple questionnaire; the entire 
process should take no more than fifteen minutes. 
 
Respond to survey 
 
To address these concerns, a random sample of taxpayers will receive a survey to be 
answered anonymously. 
 
You are one of the randomly selected taxpayers, which is why you have received this 
communication. We are grateful for the time and effort you dedicate to assessing this 
questionnaire and to responding to it as precisely as possible. 
 
Let me assure you that the survey is completely anonymous and the selection of 
recipients entirely random. The success of this project lies in the precision of your 
responses. It is on the basis of those responses and the real information they provide 
that the DGI will be able to hone the design, in the present and in the future, of its 
strategies to reduce the costs of compliance. 
 
If you have any questions about this questionnaire, please send an e-mail to 
encuestas@cedlas.org. 
 
We would like to thank you once again for your contribution to this project, which we are 
sure will benefit all taxpayers. 
 
Sincerely, 
 
Joaquín Serra 
Director of the Income Tax Department  
 
PS: If the "Respond to survey" link doesn’t open, copy the following address in your browser:https://URL. 
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A.7 Excerpt from the Online Survey Questionnaire
Introductory Text: 
 
We would like you to respond to a survey about the costs of paying taxes. We hope you 
have the ten minutes that responding to the questionnaire will require. We are 
interested in your opinion and hope you will be frank in your responses, which are 
anonymous and used only for statistical purposes. We would like to thank you for your 
participation. 
 
Questions Included in Main Module: 
 
Q1) Have you been subject to a DGI audit (inspection or monitoring) at any point in the 
last three years? 
 
Yes. 
 
 No. 
 
 
Q2)In your opinion,what is the probability that the tax returns filed by a company like 
yours be audited at least once in the next three years (from 0% to 100%)? 
 
 
Q3) How sure are you of your response? 
 
 Not at all sure. 
 
 A little sure. 
 
Somewhat sure. 
 
 Very sure. 
 
 
Q4)Let’s imagine that a company like yours is audited and that tax evasion is detected. 
What, in your opinion, is the penalty (in %) as determined by law that the firm must pay 
in addition to the originally unpaid amount? For example, a fee of X% means that, for 
each $100 not paid, the firm would have to pay those original $100 plus $X in fees. 
 
 
Q5) How sure are you of your response? 
 
 Not at all sure. 
 
 A little sure. 
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B Additional Results, Specifications and Robustness Checks
B.1 Summary Statistics of Tax Payments
Table B.1 describes the tax payments made by firms that received the baseline letter during the pre
and post treatment period. The pre-treatment period covers the year immediately before the treatment
(September 2014 – August 2015) and analogously the post-treatment period covers the twelve immediate
months after the treatment (October 2015 – September 2016). On average, the amount of VAT paid by
a firm that received a baseline letter during the pre-treatment period was USD 7,770 while the median
was around USD 4,860, with a standard deviation of USD 8,070. In the subsequent year, the average
amount of VAT paid was USD 6,470, the median USD 7,770 and the standard deviation USD 3,740. This
represents a reduction of 16,7% in the average VAT payments when comparing post and pre-treatment
periods. Since the group of firms we analyze are mainly small and medium sized firms, this could be
explained by a high turnover rate.
Retroactive VAT payments made by the firms show that most of taxpayers do not made this type
of payments. Indeed, the 75th percentile of this distribution is 0. The average amount of backward
payments made by these firms during the pre-treatment period was USD 400, while during the post
treatment period it was about 300 USD. This is consistent with the trend observed for overall VAT
payments. This is also confirmed when considering payments of other taxes. On average, firms paid USD
4,070 of other taxes in the pre-treatment period, and USD 3,300 in the post-treatment period. These
amounts correspond to other taxes applied to retail sales of specific goods and corporate taxes, among
others. The standard deviation in the pre-treatment distribution was USD 8,570 in the pre-treatment
period, which fell to USD 5,430 in the post treatment period.
This descriptive analysis is indicative of the importance of the VAT in the Uruguayan tax structure.
VAT payments are almost twice as much as payments of other taxes payments, and they represent more
than 60% of the total payments by firms in our sample.
B.2 Robustness Checks: Regression Analysis
B.2.1 Robustness Checks of Main Specification
To assess the robustness of the results from the main specification in Section 4, Table B.2 presents
alternative estimates based on different specifications. The first two columns present estimates of the
treatment effects based only on the extensive margin of VAT payments: i.e., the outcome is coded as
1 if the firm made at least one payment in the post-treatment period, and 0 otherwise. Column (1)
presents results from a linear probability model, while column (2) presents Probit estimates. There is
not much variation in the extensive margin: 96% of firms in the sample made positive payments in the
post-treatment period. This is a direct byproduct of the selection of the subject pool: we excluded all
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firms who did not make at least three payments in the 12 months before the treatment assignment. The
effects of the three different messages on the extensive margin are close to zero and not statistically
significant, although the precision of our estimates does not allows to reject a large effect in the extensive
margin.
The specifications in columns (3), (4) and (5) of Table B.2 use the amount of VAT payments as the
dependent variable. Column (3) corresponds to our main Poisson specification. In turn, column (4)
presents estimates based on Tobit regressions and (5) presents OLS estimates. The Poisson model has
a main advantage in this context: it deals naturally with bunching of payments at exactly zero, while
still allowing for the effects to be proportional. The OLS specification, instead, does not deal with the
bunching at zero and does not allow for the effects on amounts to be proportional. The Tobit specification
is more appropriate than OLS since it takes into account the censored nature of the data at zero, but it
does not allow for the effects to be proportional.
The results from columns (3), (4) and (5) of Table B.2 are identical in terms of the signs and statistical
significance of the coefficients, indicating that the results are robust to the three alternative specifications.
If anything, the effects are more statistically significant when using the OLS and Tobit models. Even
though the results from the Poisson, OLS and Tobit models are not directly comparable in terms of
magnitudes, they are roughly consistent. For example, the Tobit model suggests an effect of audit-
statistics of USD 480 (p-value=0.001). Since the average outcome is USD 6,465, this Tobit coefficient
amounts to an effect of about 7.4%, which is in the same order of magnitude than the Poisson model,
which indicates an effect of audit-statistics of 6.3% (p-value=0.013).
Column (6) of Table B.2 reports the results of estimating our model on the final tax liability calculated
on data from an alternative administrative data source, annual tax returns. The time frame in this
outcome is completely different to the one of the monthly VAT payments used for our main specification,
and therefore they do not necessarily match. However, the results in column (6), panel a in Table B.2
indicate that the effect of the audit-statistic letter is 6.8% with this alternative measure of the outcome
variable, which is indeed similar in sign and magnitude to our main result. This effect is estimated
precisely and statistical significant at the 5% level. The effect of the treatment in the falsification test is
indistinguishable from zero.
The results in panel b in Table B.2 indicate shows that the effect of the endogeneity message on the
VAT reported in the annual tax return is also similar to the effect on the monthly VAT payments. The
point estimate of the coefficient is 5.6%, smaller than the result for our main specification. However,
in this case the coefficient is less precisely estimated, and it is not statistically different from zero at
conventional levels. Finally, the results in panel c in Table B.2 indicate that the effect of the public-goods
letter on the VAT liability reported in the tax return is also close to zero, as in our main results.
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B.2.2 Robustness Checks for Heterogeneity With Respect to Prior Beliefs and Previous
Audit Experience
As an additional robustness check for heterogeneous results in terms of prior beliefs, we present the effect
of the treatment by whether the firms’ prior belief pˆ (as defined in section B.2) was below or above the
specific value of p in the letter sent to the firm as part of the audit-statistics treatment (the distribution of
the parameters included in our audit-statistics letters is depicted in Figure 1). To estimate this effect, we
divided the sample in two groups. On the one hand, firms with prior beliefs about the probability of being
audited that were low compared to the probability reported in the letter they received. On the other
hand, firms with prior beliefs equal or larger than the parameter reported in our information treatment.
Since we divide the groups according to a characteristic of firms that received the audit-statistics message,
the outcomes for both groups are compared to those of the firms that received the baseline letter.
According to the A&S model, increasing taxpayers’ beliefs about the probability of being audited
should result in higher tax payments (the opposite is also true if we reduce their perception about p).
Therefore, the expected effect of the audit-statistics message is positive on firms with pˆ < p, and negative
for firms with pˆ ≥ p. Column (2) in Table B.3 shows that the average effect of the audit-statistics letter
on VAT payments in the first year after receiving the letter is 7.1% for taxpayers with relatively low
priors. Column (3) reports that the average effect for taxpayers with relatively large priors was 9.1%.
The effect in firms with relatively low priors is positive but lower in magnitude compared to firms with
relatively high priors, and the effect on the latter has the opposite sign of the one predicted by the model.
Furthermore, differences in magnitude are economically not significant. These results, if anything, provide
evidence against the A&S predictions.
We can also test whether actual audit experience has an effect on our treatments. In columns (3)
and (4) in Table B.3, we compare the effects of the audit-statistics message between firms that were
audited in the recent past (up to 15 years before the treatment, 23,8% of the sample) and those that
were not audited during that period (the remaining 76,2% of the sample). We use the previous 15
years because that is how far back the available IRS administrative records reach. The intuition is that
firms that were audited in the recent past should have a higher perception of the probability of being
audited. The null hypothesis thus is that the effect of our audit-statistics messages should be stronger
for those that were never audited, who probably had priors about audit probabilities closer to zero and
increased their perceived probability with our messages. Moreover, we could even expect negative effects
on compliance for those who were audited in the past, because these firms probably had high priors about
audit probabilities and our information treatment should have reduced their perceptions. The results in
Table B.3 indicate that there are no heterogeneous effects with respect to recent audit experience. The
difference in treatment effects for the two groups is small and not statistically significant: the effect is
4.7% for the group of firms previously audited, and 7.1% for those with no prior audit experience (p-value
of difference = 0.252). However, the number of firms that were audited is smaller (N=2,933) than that of
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firms that were not audited in the recent past (N=9,403), and thus the coefficients for the former group
are less precisely estimated. As a result, we cannot rule out moderate differences either between the two
groups.
We can also perform a further robustness check of our Bayesian model. For our third test, we must
set the parameters α0 and β0 to generate the prior beliefs. In the body of the paper, we selected values
of these parameters to “center” beliefs around the true audit probability in our sample, 11.7%. Since
this choice may seem arbitrary, we present the results from an alternative calibration, which centers the
perceived probability around the value we obtain from the control group in our post-treatment survey –
an average perceived audit probability of 40.5% for the comparison group. The results are presented in
Figure B.2. If anything, this alternative calibration makes A&S even less plausible: as shown in panel
b, we would expect that almost everyone should update their perceived probability downwards, and thus
reduce their tax payments, which is the opposite of what we find.
B.2.3 Alternative Specifications for the Effects of Signals about Audit Probabilities and
Penalty Rates
We also assess the robustness of the estimated effects of the signals of audit probabilities and penalty
rates on post-treatment payments in two different ways.
First, Table B.4 a. replicates the analysis in Table 4 for the five additional specifications that we
also used in Table B.2. The results are essentially the same that the ones reported in section 5. The
effect of the information provided within firms that received the audit-statistics letter is zero. Both in
the extensive and intensive margin, regardless of the specification used or the source of the dependent
variable (using the tax liability from the annual tax returns as an outcome), all coefficients associated to
the treatment variable are statistically insignificant. This is also valid for the effects of the audit-threat
message. Conditional on being treated, the information reported in the letter does not affect firms’
compliance behavior.
Second, Table B.5 presents the results for an alternative specification of the elasticity estimation in
Table 4. Instead of estimating the elasticities with respect to p and θ separately, we estimate the elasticity
with respect to the product (expected penalty) p ∗ θ in a regression of the form:
Yi = α + γp·θ · pi · θi +Xiδ + i (B.1)
As in the model where p and θ were included separately, the elasticity computed with this alternative
specification is statistically and economically insignificant.
Figure B.3.a provides additional an event-study analysis of the effect of the audit-statistics message
(relative to the baseline letter) for two groups: firms that received letters with low signals of p (p<=11.7%)
and those who received high signals of p (p>11.7%). The estimates in these figures are obtained from
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regressions that control for the group dummies (quintiles of VAT payments), so they are identified purely
by the random sampling variation in p. Note that the effects are extremely similar for the two groups.
If anything, the treatment effects seem larger for the group with the lower probability messages. Figure
B.3.b presents the equivalent analysis for firms that received messages with low and high values of θ
(below and above the mean penalty rate in our sample, 30.6%). Again, the effects are very similar for
the two groups.
The results in Tables B.2 and B.5, and Figure B.3, provide further evidence supporting the fear
channel rather than a rational re optimization as a consequence of being exposed to some information
about the tax enforcement mechanisms.
B.3 Robustness Checks and Additional Results from Online Survey
B.3.1 Survey Results: Robustness to the Control Group Definition
Our analysis of the survey relied on pooling respondents from the baseline and the public-goods to form
a sufficiently large comparison group. The rationale was that neither of the two messages included
information about audit probabilities or tax evasion penalty rates. In this appendix, we assess the
robustness of the survey results in section 5.1 to alternative definitions of the sample and of the comparison
group.
Panels a and b in Figure B.3 replicates the results in panels a and b in Figure 3. The shaded gray
bars show the distribution of perceptions for the 69 survey respondents that received the baseline letter
only (Figure 3 relied on the 137 observations from the pooled baseline and public-goods groups). The
red dashed curve correspond to the distribution of signals sent to the firms in the audit-statistics letters.
Although slightly smaller than in the pooled control group, the average perceived audit probability of
the baseline letter group (37.7%) is still substantially larger than the 11.7% that results from our data for
the overall sample, and this difference is statistically significant. The results are also consistent with the
main results when we look at the perceived penalty size. There are no statistically significant differences
between the perceived penalty size by the firms that received the baseline letter and our estimates from
the overall data.
We also replicate the analysis the average effect of the audit-statistic message on the perceived audit
probability and penalty size. The average perceived probability of being audited for the baseline group
is 37.7%, which is slightly smaller than the one reported by the pooled control group (40.7%). Since this
number is closer to the average perceived audit probability for the audit-statistics group (35.2%) and the
statistical power is substantially reduced by the lower number of observations (the control group reduced
to the half), the mean difference test does not reject the null that both means are equal. However, the
results are in the same direction that our main results. If anything, the audit-statistics letter reduced
the average perceived probability of being audited. The results of the penalty size differences between
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treated and control groups are also consistent with the main results. The audit-statistics letter did not
affect taxpayers perceptions about the average penalty size and in general the prior beliefs of the firms
were accurate.
Finally, we present an additional robustness test of the results in Figure 3. To increase the likelihood
that survey respondents were the ones who received our experimental messages, we impose an additional
restriction. We do the same analysis but restricting our sample to survey respondents who self-identified
as firm owners in the survey. The results with this restricted sample (which reduced the treatment group
from 365 to 341 observations, and the pooled control group from 137 to 125), presented in panels c and d
in Figure B.3, are very similar to those reported in the body of the paper. Our audits-statistics treatment
significantly reduced the perceived probability of audits, although it did not affect the average perception
of penalty rates.
If firms were rational, all these results would imply that firms would have paid less taxes as a con-
sequence of the update in their beliefs. However, this is not what it is observed. Hence, this evidence
supports the hypothesis that the fear channel is driving the results rather than a rational re-optimization.
B.3.2 Beliefs About Audit Endogeneity
As in the case of the audit-statistics treatment arm, we conducted a survey of letter recipients in which
we included a specific question to assess whether the information provided in the letter had an impact
on beliefs about the endogeneity of audits:
Perceived Audit Endogeneity: “In your opinion, if a firm that evades taxes doubles the amount
it is evading, what is the effect on its probability of being audited?” The possible answers
were: It would increase significantly; It would increase slightly; It would not change; It would
diminish slightly; It would diminish significantly.
The distribution of responses to this question about the perceived endogeneity of audits is depicted in
Figure B.5. The distribution of perceptions in the baseline letter suggests that firms were already aware
of this endogeneity. Relative to the baseline group, there are no statistically significant differences in
the distribution of perceptions for the audit-endogeneity group. In a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 is “more
evasion significantly increases the probability of being audited”, and 5 means “more evasion significantly
diminish the probability of being audited”, the average belief was 1.45 in the baseline group and 1.41 for
the audit-endogeneity group (p-value of the difference 0.67).
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Table B.1: Tax Payments: Summary Statistics
Mean
(1)
SD
(2)
10th
(3)
25th
(4)
50th
(5)
75th
(6)
90th
(7)
VAT Amounts
Post-treatment 6.47 7.77 0.44 1.30 3.74 8.48 16.55
Pre-Treatment 7.77 8.07 0.96 1.99 4.86 10.94 19.73
Retroactive VAT Amounts
Post-treatment 0.30 1.40 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.62
Pre-Treatment 0.40 1.76 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.81
Other Taxes Amounts
Post-Treatment 3.30 5.43 0.00 0.95 1.81 3.52 7.42
Pre-Treatment 4.07 8.57 0.04 1.43 2.14 4.37 8.72
Notes: The statistics in this table correspond to firms that received the baseline letter (N=2,064). The pre-treatment
period ranges from September 1, 2014 to August 31, 2015, and the post-treatment period ranges from October 1, 2015
to September 30, 2016. The source of the data are IRS administrative data records. VAT amounts corresponds to VAT
payments and withholdings. Retroactive VAT amounts correspond to two months or more retroactive VAT payments and
withholdings, e.g. VAT payments made in March 2016 corresponding to September 2015. Other taxes includes payments
for the corporate tax, the wealth tax and other specific taxes to business activity.
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Table B.2: Average Effects of Audit-Statistics, Audit-Endogeneity and Public-Goods Messages: Alternative
Specifications and Data Sources
Prob. Making Positive
VAT Payments
VAT
Payments
VAT
Declared
OLS
(1)
Probit
(2)
Poisson
(3)
OLS
(4)
Tobit
(5)
Poisson
(6)
a. Audit - Statistics (N=10,272 [6,088]) vs Baseline (N=2,064 [1,270])
Post-Treatment -0.001 -0.019 0.063** 0.493*** 0.480*** 0.068**
(0.004) (0.066) (0.025) (0.140) (0.147) (0.030)
Pre-Treatment -0.008 0.047 0.049 0.011
(0.021) (0.128) (0.128) (0.031)
b. Audit - Endogeneity (N=2,039 [1,233]) vs Baseline (N=2,064 [1,270])
Post-Treatment 0.001 -0.006 0.074** 0.591*** 0.592*** 0.056
(0.006) (0.085) (0.032) (0.189) (0.195) (0.043)
Pre-Treatment -0.006 0.057 0.060 0.027
(0.027) (0.169) (0.169) (0.039)
c. Public - Goods (N=2,017 [1,240]) vs. Baseline (N=2,064[1,270])
Post-Treatment 0.006 0.045 0.043 0.333* 0.357** -0.014
(0.006) (0.087) (0.030) (0.171) (0.177) (0.040)
Pre-Treatment -0.004 0.059 0.065 0.056
(0.026) (0.162) (0.162) (0.042)
Mean of Dep. Var. 0.956 6.465 7.194
Notes: * significant at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, *** at the 1% level. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Panel a. compares the audit-statistics message with the baseline letter, while panels b. and c. replicate the analysis for
the audit-endogeneity and public goods messages respectively. In the first row of each panel, the dependent variable is
the amount of VAT payments (in dollars) in the first year after receiving the letter (October 2015–September 2016). The
second row presents a falsification test in which we estimate the same regression, but using the amount contributed the
year before receiving the mailing as the dependent variable (September 2014–August 2015). The mean of the dependent
variable reported in the last row corresponds to the mean of the baseline group. All regressions are estimated with a set of
monthly controls that correspond to the year before the outcome, i.e. in the post treatment outcome we include monthly
VAT payment controls from September, 2014 to August, 2015 and in pre-treatment outcome we include the same variables
for the September, 2013 - August 2014 period. We also restrict the analysis to those firms that effectively received the
letter. Columns (1) and (2) show the treatment effect on the extensive margin using two alternative strategies. Column (1)
presents the treatment effect on the probability of making at least one VAT payment in the post treatment period using
an OLS model. Column (2) replicates the same analysis using a Probit model. Columns (3), (4) and (5) present different
estimation strategies for the intensive margin, i.e. the total amount of VAT paid. In column (3) we present the results
from our main specification (a Poisson regression), while column (4) uses an OLS regression and column (5) presents Tobit
estimation results. Column (6) reports the result of estimating a Poisson model on the final VAT liability calculated from
annual tax returns. The last row of the table presents the mean of the outcomes for the baseline group.
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Table B.3: Effects of Audit-Statistics: By Prior Beliefs (pˆ) and Information Treatment’s Audit Probability
(p), and by by Previous Audit Experience
By pˆ Audited in 2001-2015
All
(1)
pˆ < p
(2)
pˆ ≥ p
(3)
Yes
(4)
No
(5)
a. Audit - Statistics vs Baseline
Post-Treatment 0.063** 0.071*** 0.091*** 0.047 0.071**
(0.025) (0.025) (0.030) (0.042) (0.031)
Pre-Treatment -0.008 -0.001 0.017 -0.062* 0.016
(0.021) (0.014) (0.016) (0.037) (0.025)
Observations 12,336 8,711 5,689 2,933 9,403
Notes: * significant at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, *** at the 1% level. Robust standard errors in parentheses. The
regressions present comparisons of outcomes for firms receiving the audit-statistics message with those that received the
baseline letter. In the first row, the dependent variable is the amount of VAT payments (in dollars) in the first year after
receiving the letter (October 2015–September 2016). The second row presents a falsification test in which we estimate
the same regression, but using the amount contributed the year before receiving the mailing as the dependent variable
(September 2014–August 2015). All regressions are estimated with a set of monthly controls that correspond to the year
before the outcome, i.e. in the post treatment outcome we include monthly VAT payment controls from September, 2014
to August, 2015 and in pre-treatment outcome we include the same variables for the September, 2013–August 2014 period.
We also include the stratification variable used to randomize the parameters. The analysis is restricted to those firms that
effectively received the letter as reported by the postal service. The results are based on Poisson regressions, so coefficients
can be interpreted directly as semi-elasticities. Column (1) shows results from the main specification, i.e. the first year effect
estimates (October 2015–September 2016). Column (2) reports the effect of the audit-statistics message on firms whose
prior beliefs about the probability of being audited were below the p reported in the letter that they received. Column (3)
reports the results for firms whose prior beliefs were above the reported p. Column (4) reports estimates for firms that
were audited at least once between 2001 and 2015, and Column (3) for the group of firms that were not audited during
that period. Because the baseline letter was the comparison group in both columns, the sum of the number of observations
in each regression does not add up to 12,336, which is the total number of firms considered in the main analysis.
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Table B.4: Effects of Audit-Statistics and Audit-Threat Sub-Treatments: Alternative Specifications
Prob. Making Positive
VAT Payments
VAT
Payments
VAT
Declared
OLS
(1)
Probit
(2)
Poisson
(3)
OLS
(4)
Tobit
(5)
Poisson
(6)
a. Audit - Statistics (N=10,272 [6,088])
Audit Probability (%)
Post-Treatment 0.007 0.376 0.030 -0.441 0.141 -0.202
(0.040) (0.619) (0.236) (1.617) (1.728) (0.244)
Pre-Treatment 0.025 0.183 0.212 -0.056
(0.115) (0.943) (0.945) (0.163)
Penalty Size (%)
Post-Treatment 0.002 0.079 -0.118 -0.362 -0.319 -0.114
(0.021) (0.316) (0.115) (0.856) (0.896) (0.134)
Pre-Treatment -0.001 -0.123 -0.133 0.226***
(0.088) (0.785) (0.785) (0.087)
b. Audit - Threat Letters (N=4,048 [3,236])
Post-Treatment 0.009 0.160 0.376* 1.325 1.253 0.450**
(0.026) (0.320) (0.210) (0.900) (0.940) (0.203)
Pre-Treatment -0.342* -0.958 -0.954 -0.528*
(0.178) (0.695) (0.699) (0.315)
Mean of Dep. Var. 0.943 6.465 7.194
Notes: * significant at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, *** at the 1% level. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Panel a. presents the effect of providing different information regarding p and θ in the audit-statistics message. Panel b.
compares the two audit-threat messages, i.e. the 50% threat of audit vs. the 25% threat of audit. Rows (1) and (3) of panel
a. present the effect of informing an additional percentage point of p and θ respectively on post treatment VAT payments
in the first year after receiving the letter (October 2015–September 2016). Rows (2) and (4) present a falsification test
in which we estimate the same regression but using VAT payments during the year before receiving the mailing as the
dependent variable (September 2014–August 2015). The last row corresponds to the mean of the outcomes for the baseline
group. All regressions are estimated with a set of monthly controls that correspond to the year before the outcome, i.e.
in the post treatment outcome we include monthly VAT payment controls from September, 2014 to August, 2015 and in
the pre-treatment outcome we include the same variables for the September, 2013–August 2014 period. The analysis is
restricted to those firms that effectively received the letter as reported by the postal service. Row (1) in panel b. presents
the post treatment effect of receiving the letter of 50% threat relative to receive the 25% letter. These coefficients can
be interpreted as elasticities. Row (2) of panel b. replicates the estimates for the pre-treatment outcomes. Column (1)
presents the treatment effect on the probability of making at least one VAT payment in the post treatment period using
a OLS model. Column (2) replicates the same analysis using a probit model. Columns (3), (4) and (5) present different
estimation strategies for the intensive margin, i.e. the total amount of VAT paid. In column (3) we present the results of a
Poisson estimation, while column (4) uses an OLS regression and column (5) presents the Tobit estimation results. Column
(6) reports the result of estimating a Poisson model on the final VAT liability calculated from an alternative administrative
source, annual tax returns. The last row of the table presents the each of each outcome for the baseline group.
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Table B.5: Effects of Audit-Statistics Sub-Treatments: Alternative Specification of p · θ
By Time Horizon By Payment Timing By Tax Type
First Year
(1)
Second Year
(2)
Retroactive
(3)
Concurrent
(4)
Non - VAT
(5)
VAT + Non-VAT
(6)
a. Audit - Statistics Letters (N=10,272)
p*θ (%)
Post-Treatment -0.373 -0.537 -1.839 -0.290 -0.902 -0.511
(0.530) (0.549) (3.003) (0.543) (0.938) (0.562)
Pre-Treatment 0.049 0.112 -4.028** 0.249 -1.001 -0.282
(0.316) (0.160) (2.012) (0.327) (0.827) (0.374)
Notes: * significant at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, *** at the 1% level. Robust standard error. Panel a. presents the
effect of providing different information from the audit-statistics message, computing the effect of the product regarding
p*θ. Row (1) of panel a. presents the effect of informing an additional percentage point of p and θ respectively on post
treatment VAT payments in the first year after receiving the letter (October 2015–September 2016). Row (2) presents a
falsification test in which we estimate the same regression but using VAT payments during the year before receiving the
mailing as the dependent variable (September 2014–August 2015). All regressions are estimated with a set of monthly
controls that correspond to the year before the outcome, i.e. in the post treatment outcome we include monthly VAT
payment controls from September, 2014 to August, 2015 and in the pre-treatment outcome we include the same variables
for the September, 2013–August 2014 period. The analysis is restricted to those firms that effectively received the letter as
reported by the postal service. Column (1) presents the first year effect estimates (October 2015–September 2016) while
Column (2) reports the effect of the letter in the second year after the treatment (October 2016–September 2017). Columns
(3) and (4) show the first year effect of treatment on retroactive (3) and concurrent (4) VAT payments. Columns (5) and (6)
report the results by type of tax. Column (5) shows the first year effect of the treatment in other non-VAT tax payments,
while column (6) reports the effect on the total amount of taxes paid by the firms in the same period.
..
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Figure B.1: Distribution of Statistics Shown in Audit-Statistics Letters
a. Audit Probability (p) b. Penalty Rate (θ)
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Notes: The data corresponds to the distribution of the information provided in the audit-statistics letters (N=10,272).
Panel a. presents the distribution of the probability of being audited (p ). Panel b represents the distribution of the average
penalty rate (θ). p and θ arise from the following procedure: 1) divide the firms in pre-treatment VAT payment quintiles,
2) randomly draw a sample of 50 similar firms (i.e. from the same quintile) and 3) compute the average p and θ from that
sample. This algorithm lead to 950 different combinations of the two parameters.
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Figure B.2: Effect of audit-statistics vs. baseline, by Prior Beliefs
a. Effect of audit probability signal b. Effect of audit probability signal
by quartile of prior beliefs (calibrated to 40.5%) by quartile of prior minus signal (calibrated to 40.5%)
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Notes: Panel a. (N=11,989) plots the first-year effect (October 2015–September 2016) of the audit-statistics letter on
total VAT payments by quartiles of prior beliefs while panel b. (N=11,989) reports the same results by quartiles of the
difference between the prior belief and the signal sent in the audit-statistics message. The prior belief is computed as
pˆi = 1 −
(
1− α0+Niα0+β0+Ti
)3
where α0 = 1.36 and β0 = 1 such that the mean prior belief about the probability of being
audited at least once in the following three years matches the average probability perceived by firms in the baseline and public
goods groups according to the survey answers (40.5%). In panel b. the signal for the placebo group was randomly assigned
using the same strategy that for the audit-statistics group. The red dashed line represents the linear fit corresponding to
the estimates for the four quartiles. In panel a, the green dashed line represents the average perceived probability (40.5%)
for the comparison group, and in panel b. it represents the point in which prior belief and signal are equal. In both panels,
each dot represents the estimated treatment effect for each quartile of the variable considered. Regressions are estimated
using monthly pre-treatment controls. All effects are depicted with the 95% confidence interval. The results are based on
Poisson regressions, so coefficients can be interpreted directly as semi-elasticities. Confidence intervals are computed with
robust standard errors.
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Figure B.3: Effects of Audit-Statistics by Level of the Signal and by Quarter
a. Effect of audit-statistics vs. baseline, by level of p b. Effect of audit-statistics vs. baseline, by level of θ
−0
.1
0.0
0.1
0.2
Tr
ea
tm
en
t E
ffe
ct
−2 −1 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 +6 +7 +8
Quarter
≥ 11.7% < 11.7%
−0
.1
0.0
0.1
0.2
Tr
ea
tm
en
t E
ffe
ct
−2 −1 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 +6 +7 +8
Quarter
≥ 30.6% < 30.6%
Notes: Panels a. and b. (N=10,272) present the effect of p and θ reported in the audit-statistics messages, dividing the
sample by above and below the mean value of the corresponding signal. Each dot in panels a. and b. represents the
estimate of the effect of treatment on VAT payments for a specific quarter from two quarters before treatment up to eight
quarters after receiving the letter. Red dots in panels a. and b. represent the effect for audit-statistics letter recipients with
messages about p or θ above the mean respectively. Green dots represent the same effect but for those with signals about
p and θ below the mean respectively. Regressions do not include monthly pre-treatment controls. The results are based on
Poisson regressions, so coefficients can be interpreted directly as semi-elasticities. 90% confidence intervals represented by
red and green lines are computed with robust standard errors.
.
xxii
Figure B.4: Survey Results: Perceived p and θ, Alternative Samples and Comparison Group
Audit Probability - p Penalty rate - θ
a. Audit-Statistics vs. Baseline b. Audit-Statistics vs. Baseline
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c. Audit-Statistics vs. Baseline and Public-Goods, d. Audit-Statistics vs. Baseline and Public-Goods,
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Notes: In panels a. and b. Perceived (baseline) (N=69) refers to survey respondents who received the baseline letter during
the experimental stage while Perceived (audit statistics) (N=365) refers to respondents who received audit-statistics letters.
In panels c. and d., we rely on pooled control group (recipients of baseline and public-goods letters), but we restrict the
sample to survey respondents who self-identified as owners (N of baseline group = 61, N of public-goods group=64, N of
audit-statistics group = 341). We also report the mean of the perceptions for each parameter and the the p-value of the
difference between the groups in each figure. The answers correspond to questions Q2 and Q4 (see full survey questionnaire
in Appendix A.7). In panels a. and c. the x-axis represents the probability of being audited; in panels b. and d. it represents
the average penalty rate. The red line represents the density function of the information displayed in the audit-statistics
letters, measured in the right y-axis (hidden for the sake clarity).
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Figure B.5: Perception of Endogeneity of Audits
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Notes: Perceived (pooled control group) (N=137) refers to respondents who received the baseline or the public-goods letters
during the experimental stage, while Perceived Endogeneity (N=79) refers to respondents who received audit-endogeneity
letters. These answers correspond to the question Q6 of the survey questionnaire (see the full questionnaire in Appendix
A.7). The x axis represents the different categories presented as survey options.
.
xxiv
C Calibration of Allingham and Sandmo (1972)
In this appendix, we compute the predicted elasticities of taxes paid with respect to audit and penalty
rates under different calibrations of A&S. These elasticities provide a useful benchmark for the corre-
sponding elasticities estimated in the context of the field experiment and discussed in the body of the
paper.
C.1 Setup
We use an extension of the original A&S. Let Y be the total value-added and let τ be the value added
tax rate. Let E be the amount to be under-reported (so τ · E is the amount evaded). Let p be the
probability that the tax return for a given year will be audited sometime in the future, and θ as the
penalty rate applied over the amount evaded when caught (both of these parameters are defined as in
the audit-statistics treatment).
The probability of being audited is defined as p = p0 + p1EY , where p1 > 0 represents the endogeneity
of the audit process: i.e., firms that evade more may be more likely to be audited. In the original A&S
the audit probability is exogenous so p1 = 0. In addition to being audited, we assume that firms may be
caught evading due to some non-audit technology (e.g., whistle-blowing). As a result, the probability of
being caught evading is p+ , where the parameter epsilon represents this non-audit technology.
Each firm has a utility from income given by a Constant Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA) utility
function with risk parameter σ. We incorporate some form of social responsibility into the model. To do
this, we assume that individuals get some direct utility from paying taxes, equal to the fraction α of the
amount paid. This social responsibility parameter α can take values from 0 to 1, where a higher value
denotes higher social responsibility. In the original A&S setting, this parameter is implicitly set to α = 0.
The optimal evasion is given by maximizing the expected utility:
max
E∈[0,Y ]
1− p
(
E
Y
)
− 
1− σ
(
Y − ατ(Y − E)
)1−σ
+
p
(
E
Y
)
+ 
1− σ
(
Y − ατ(Y − E)− (1 + θ)τE
)1−σ
The FOC for the interior solution are:
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(
1− p
(
E
Y
)
− 
)(
Y − ατ(Y − E)
)−σ
ατ −
∂p(EY )
∂E
Y (1− σ)
(
Y − ατ(Y − E)
)1−σ
−
−
(
p
(
E
Y
)
+ 
)(
Y − ατ(Y − E)− (1 + θ)τE
)−σ
(1 + θ − α)τ+
+
∂p(EY )
∂E
Y (1− σ)
(
Y − ατ(Y − E)− (1 + θ)τE
)1−σ
= 0
(
Y − ατ(Y − E)
)−σ(
(1− p
(
E
Y
)
− )ατ −
∂p(EY )
∂E
Y (1− σ)(Y − ατ(Y − E))
)
=
(
Y −ατ(Y −E)− (1+ θ)τE
)−σ((
p
(
E
Y
)
+ 
)
(1+ θ−α)τ −
∂p(EY )
∂E
Y (1− σ)(Y −ατ(Y −E)− (1+ θ)τE)
)
In the traditional A&S specification, with α = 1, p1 = 0 and  = 0, we can obtain a closed analytical
form for the elasticities between the VAT payments and p and θ:
∂log (τ(Y − E))
∂p
= −(1− τ)
− 1
σ
(
pθ
1−p
)−σ+1
σ θ(1+θ)
(1−p)2(
θ
(
pθ
1−p
)− 1
σ + 1
)2 (
τ − (1− τ)
(
( pθ1−p)
− 1σ−1
1+θ( pθ1−p)
− 1σ
))
∂log (τ(Y − E))
∂θ
= −(1− τ)−(1 + θ)
1
σ
(
pθ
1−p
)−σ+1
σ p
1−p −
(
pθ
1−p
)− 1
σ (
(
pθ
1−p
)− 1
σ − 1)(
θ
(
pθ
1−p
)− 1
σ + 1
)2 (
τ − (1− τ)
(
( pθ1−p)
− 1σ−1
1+θ( pθ1−p)
− 1σ
))
When we expand the model with α < 1 or  > 0, we can still get closed-form expressions for these
two elasticities. However, such elasticities no longer have closed-form solutions when we allow for p1 > 0.
In this last case, we use standard numerical methods to compute these elasticities.
C.2 Calibration Results
Table C.1 presents the calibration results. Each row corresponds to a different calibration of A&S.
The first seven columns correspond to the parameter values: σ, τ , p0, p1, , θ and α. The last three
columns correspond to the predictions of the model under those parameter values. All the parameters
are calibrated so that they always predict an evasion rate (E
Y
) of 26%, which corresponds to the average
evasion rate estimated for Uruguay (Gomez-Sabaini and Jimenez, 2012). As a result, all the predictions
in the column corresponding to E
Y
are the same. We predict the two elasticities discussed in the section
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above, which correspond to the same elasticities estimated in the experimental analysis. The elasticity
∂log(τ(Y−E))
∂p
corresponds to the percent change in taxes paid when we increase the audit probability by
one percentage point . The elasticity ∂log(τ(Y−E))
∂θ
corresponds to the percent change in taxes paid when
we increase the penalty rate by one percentage point.
All the calibrations are based on the observed tax rate, τ = 0.22. The calibrations are divided in
two groups of four rows each. In the first set of four rows, we assume a CRRA of 4. The model in the
first row sets the audit probability and the penalty rate equal to be exogenous and equal to the average
values observed in our sample: p0 = 0.117 and θ = 0.306. Given any reasonable value for the CRRA
parameter, this model would predict 100% evasion. As a result, we need to extend the model in some
way to accommodate the evasion rate of 26% observed in practice. In the first row, we do this by allowing
for a non-audit detection rate of  = 0.581. Under this specification, the elasticity with respect to the
audit probability is 4.55 and the elasticity with respect to the penalty rate is 3.48. This is the simplest
extension to the A&S model, and given that its predictions are in the middle range of all the predictions
presented in the table, we consider this as our preferred specification.
In the second row, instead of accommodating the evasion rate of 26% by introducing the non-audit
detection rate, we use instead the social responsibility parameter. Assuming a value of α = 0.195, we
can fit the observed evasion rate of 26%. Under this very different approach, the predicted elasticities
differ substantially, but are still of the same order of magnitude: the elasticity with respect to the audit
probability is 9.422, and the elasticity with respect to the penalty rate is 1.208.
The third row follows a similar specification from the second row, but we augment it by allowing for
an endogenous audit probability. We let p0 = p1 = 0.0896, which accommodates two important features
of the audit probabilities: the effective audit probability turns out to be equal to the observed average
probability of 11.7%; and, consistent with the content of the audit-endogeneity message, if a firm that
does not evade taxes (E
Y
= 0) would double its audit probability if they decided to evade taxes (E
Y
= 1).
This endogeneity would not be nearly enough on its own to fit the observed evasion rate, so we use again
the social responsibility parameter to fit the data by setting α = 0.229. This specification shows that
introducing the endogenous nature of the audit probabilities does not change the elasticity with respect
to the audit probability much (it is 4.386, similar to the 4.55 from the first specification), although it
does substantially reduce the elasticity with respect to the penalty rate (to 0.59).
The fourth row follows a similar specification as in the second row, but we extend it by allowing
individuals to have biased perceptions about the audits: p0 = 0.367 and θ = 0.31. These biases would
not be nearly enough on their own to fit the observed evasion rate, so we use again the social responsibility
parameter to fit the data by setting α = 0.590. Again, we obtain elasticities that are of the same order of
magnitude as in the other specifications: the elasticity with respect to the audit probability is 4.02 and
the one with respect to the penalty rate is 1.64.
The specifications in the second set of four rows are identical to those in the first set of four rows,
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except that we assume a CRRA parameter of 2 instead of a CRRA of 4. The results indicate that
assuming a higher risk aversion provides more conservative estimates, because the lower risk aversion
induces larger elasticities.
In sum, the different specifications produce elasticities with respect to the audit probability between
4.02 and 18.857, and elasticities with respect to the penalty rate between 0.66 and 6.60.
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Table C.1: VAT Payment Elasticities with Respect to the Main Parameters. Calibrated with Actual and Perceived Audit
Probability Means
Setup Predictions
Risk Aversion Tax Rate Detection Rate Penalty Social Responsibility
σ τ p0 p1  θ α
E
Y
∂log(τ(Y−E))
∂p
∂log(τ(Y−E))
∂θ
4 0.22 0.117 0 0.581 0.306 1 0.26 4.548 3.475
4 0.22 0.117 0 0 0.306 0.195 0.26 9.422 1.208
4 0.22 0.0896 0.0896 0 0.306 0.229 0.26 4.386 0.592
4 0.22 0.367 0 0 0.31 0.590 0.26 4.021 1.642
2 0.22 0.117 0 0.620 0.306 1 0.26 9.854 6.600
2 0.22 0.117 0 0 0.306 0.169 0.26 18.857 2.111
2 0.22 0.0896 0.0896 0 0.306 0.202 0.26 5.556 0.664
2 0.22 0.367 0 0 0.31 0.534 0.26 8.038 2.829
Notes: Each row corresponds to a different calibration of the extended A&S model presented in the text. The first seven columns correspond to the
parameter values. The last three columns correspond to the predictions of the model under those parameter values. The predicted evasion rate (EY )
is always 26% because all the specifications were calibrated to match the observed average evasion rate..
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